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STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Re: Daniel S. Fuchs, dba, Aubrey's House of Ale v. Idaho State Police, 
Alcohol Beverage Control, Case No. 38714-2011 
RESPONDENT'S ADDITIONAL CITATIONS 
Relating to the issue of the application of 2012 Idaho Senate Bill l 33 2: 
l. House Bill 421 before the Sixtieth Legislature, Second Regular Session, State ofldaho, 2010. 
2. IDAHO CODE § 73- l O 1. 
3.Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012). 
4. Hill v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 150 Idaho 619, 628-629, 249 P.3d 812, 
821-822 (2011). 
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Bill Status: H0421 
HOUSE BILL 421 
Full Bill Information 
Individual Links: 
Bill Text 
Statement of Purpose/ Fiscal Note 
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H0421 ..................................... bY JUDICIARY, RULES, AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES - Amends existing law to clarify when attorney's fees, witness 
fees and expenses may be awarded in certain instances. 
01/26 House intro - 1st rdg - to printing 
O 1/27 Rpt prt - to Jud 
02/04 Rpt out - rec d/p - to 2nd rdg 
02/05 2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg 
02/08 3rd rdg - PASSED - 69-1-0 
AYES -- Anderson, Andrus, Barrett, Bayer, Bedke, Bell, Bilbao, Black, 
Block, Boe, Bolz, Boyle, Burgoyne, Chadderdon, Chavez, Chew, Clark, 
Collins, Crane, Cronin, Durst, Eskridge, Gibbs, Hagedorn, Hart, 
Hartgen, Harwood, Henderson, Higgins, Jaquet, Jarvis, Killen, King, 
Kren, Labrador, Lake, Loertscher, Luker, Marriott, Mathews, 
McGeachin, Moyle, Nielsen, Nonini, Palmer, Pasley-Stuart, Patrick, 
Pence, Raybould, Ringo, Roberts, Ruchti, Rusche, Sayler, Schaefer, 
Shepherd(02), Shepherd(08), Shirley, Simpson, Smith(30), Smith(24), 
Stevenson, Takasugi, Thayn, Thompson, Trail, Wills, Wood(27), 
Mr. Speaker 
NAYS -- Wood(35) 
Absent and excused -- None 
Floor Sponsor - Burgoyne 
Title a pvd - to Senate 
02/09 Senate intro - 1st rdg - to Jud 
02/16 Rpt out - rec d/p - to 2nd rdg 
02/17 2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg 
02/24 3rd rdg - PASSED - 35-0-0 
AYES -- Andreason, Bair, Bilyeu, Bock, Brackett, Broadsword, 
Cameron, Coiner, Corder, Darrington, Davis, Fulcher, Geddes, Goedde, 
Hammond, Heinrich, Hill, Jorgenson, Kelly, Keough, LeFavour, Lodge, 
Malepeai, McGee, McKague, McKenzie, Mortimer, Pearce, Schroeder, 
Siddoway, Smyser, Stegner, Stennett(Stennett), Werk, Winder 
NAYS -- None 
Absent and excused -- None 
Floor Sponsor - Bock 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/201 0/H0421 Printer Friendly .htm 5/7/2012 
Bill Status: H0421 
Title apvd - to House 
02/25 To enrol 
02/26 Rpt enrol - Sp signed 
03/01 Pres signed 
03/02 To Governor 
03/04 Governor signed 
Session Law Chapter 29 
Effective: 05/31/09 for all cases pending and filed as of 
06/01/09 
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Sixtieth Legislature Second Regular Session - 2010 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE BILL NO. 421 
BY JUDICIARY, RULES, AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
AN ACT 
2 RELATING TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS; AMENDING SECTION 12-117, IDAHO 
3 CODE, TO CLARIFY WHEN ATTORNEY'S FEES, WITNESS FEES AND EXPENSES MAY BE 
4 AWARDED IN CERTAIN INSTANCES AND TO INCLUDE A DEFINITION; DECLARING AN 
5 EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. 
6 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
7 SECTION 1. That Section 12-117, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
8 amended to read as follows: 
9 12-117. ATTORNEY'S FEES, WITNESS FEES AND EXPENSES AWARDED IN CERTAIN 
10 INSTANCES. ( 1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative 
11 proceeding or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state 
12 agency, a city, a county or other taning district or political subdivision 
13 and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as the 
14 case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
15 witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if the court it finds that the 
16 nonprevailing party against whoffi the judgffleHt is rendered acted without a 
17 reasonable basis in fact or law. 
18 ( 2) If tfle 13:eevailing party is awarded a partial j udgfflent and tl,e court 
19 finds the party against whoffl partial judgfflent is rendered acted witl,out a 
20 reasonable basis in fact or law, the court ol,all allow tl,e prevailing party's 
21 attorney's fees, witness fees and ex13enoes in an afflount wl,ich reflects 
22 tl,e person's partial :eecovery a party to an administrative proceeding or 
23 to a civil judicial proceeding prevails on a portion of the case, and the 
24 state agency or political subdivision or the court, as the case may be, 
25 finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in 
26 fact or law with respect to that portion of the case, it shall award the 
27 partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and 
28 other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the case on which 
29 it prevailed. 
30 (3) Expenses awarded against a state agency, city, county or other 
31 taxing district or political subdivision pursuant to this section shall 
32 be paid from funds in the regular operating budget of the state agency, 
33 tl,e city, the county or tl,e taHing district or political subdivision. If 
34 sufficient funds are not available in the budget of the state agency, the 
35 expenses shall be considered a claim governed by the provisions of section 
36 67-2018, Idaho Code. If sufficient funds are not available in the budget 
37 of the city, county OE taHing district political subdivision, the expenses 
38 shall be considered a claim pursuant to chapter 9, title 6, Idaho Code. Every 
39 state agency, city, county or taMing district political subdivision against 
40 which litigation expenses have been awarded under this act shall, at the time 
41 of submission of its proposed budget, submit a report to the governmental 
2 
body which appropriates its funds in which the amount of expenses awarded and 
2 paid under this act during the fiscal year is stated. 
3 ( 4) For the purposes of this section: 
4 (a) "Person" shall mean any individual, partnership, corporation, 
5 association or any other private organization; 
6 (b) "Political subdivision" shall mean a city, a county or any taxing 
7 district. 
8 l£l. "State agency" shall mean any agency as defined in section 67-5201, 
9 Idaho Code. 
10 (5) If the amount pleaded in an action by a person is two thousand five 
11 hundred dollars ($2,500) or less, the person must satisfy the requirements 
12 of section 12-120, Idaho Code, as well as the requirements of this section 
13 before he or she may recover attorney's fees, witness fees or expenses 
14 pursuant to this section. 
15 SECTION 2. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby 
16 declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its 
17 passage and approval, and retroactively to May 31, 2009 and shall apply to 
18 all cases filed and pending as of June 1, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS19257 
Jn 1989, the Idaho Supreme Court construed Idaho Code Section 12-117 to permit awards of costs 
and attorney fees to prevailing parties not only in court cases, but also in administrative cases. 
Under the statute, such awards are only made if the non-prevailing party has pursued or defended 
the case without a basis in fact or law. On June I, 2009, in the case of Ramm ell v. Department of 
Agriculture, the Supreme Court reversed its 1989 decision and ruled that attorney fees could not 
be awarded in administrative cases. This bill will restore the law as it has existed since 1989, and 
it will become effective on May 31, 2009 so that those administrative cases which were pending 
when the Rammell decision was issued will not be adversely affected by the Supreme Courts ruling. 
FISCAL NOTE 
There will be no change in fiscal impact on the General Fund. 
Contact: 
Name: Representative Grant Burgoyne 
Office: 
Phone: (208) 3 32- I 083 





GENERAL CODE PROVISIONS 
CHAPTER 1 
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 
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73-101. CODES NOT RETROACTIVE. No part of these compiled laws is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 
History: 
[(73-101) C.C.P. 1881, sec. 2; R.S., sec. 3; reen. R.C., sec. 3; reen. 
C.L. 500:3; c.s., sec. 9443; I.C.A., sec. 70-101.] 
The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho and is made available on the Internet as a public 
service. Any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial purposes is in 
violation of the provisions of Idaho law and shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of Idaho's 
copyright. 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title73/T73CH1SECT73-101 PrinterFriendly.htm 5/8/2012 
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Westlaw. 
272 P.3d 1247 
152 Idaho 616,272 P.3d 1247 
(Cite as: 152 Idaho 616,272 P.3d 1247) 
H 
Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Coeur d'Alene, September 201 I Term. 
Lois M. BISHOP, personal representative of Patri-
cia J. Shelton, deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
R. Bruce OWENS and Jane Doe Owens, husband 
and wife, and the marital community composed 
thereof; Owens & Crandall, PLLC, a limited liabil-
ity company operating in the State of Idaho; R. 
Bruce Owens and Jeffrey J. Crandall, individually, 
and in their capacities as principals, managers, 
agents, partners, representatives, and employees of 
Owens & Crandall, PLLC, Defendants-Appellants. 
Owens & Crandall, PLLC, Third-Party Plaintiff, 
V. 
Idaho State Insurance Fund, Third-Party Defend-
ant. 
No. 37992. 
Jan. 12, 2012. 
Rehearing Denied March 13, 2012. 
Background: Client brought action against attor-
ney alleging breach of contract and legal malprac-
tice based on alleged breach of attorney-client rela-
tionship and contingency fee agreement. After cli-
ent passed away during pendency of action, the 
District Court, First Judicial District, Kootenai 
County, 2010 WL 3393364,John P. Luster, J., held 
that legal malpractice claim did not abate upon cli-
ent's death and that client's breach of contract ac-
tion stated a claim. Attorney appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, W. Jones, J., held 
that: 
(I) legal malpractice claim sounded in tort, rather 
than contract, and 
(2) client failed to state a breach of contract claim 
for which relief could be granted. 
Reversed. 
Page 2 of 13 
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J. Jones, J., specially concurred and filed opin-
ion. 
Hmton, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
111 Appeal and Error 30 iC=358 
30 Appeal and Error 
30VII Transfer of Cause 
30VII(B) Petition or Prayer, Allowance, and 
Certificate or Affidavit 
30k358 k. Necessity of allowance or 
leave. Most Cited Cases 
Generally, an appeal by permission will be per-
mitted when the order involves a controlling ques-
tion of law as to which there is substantial grounds 
for difference of opinion and that an immediate ap-
peal may materially advance the orderly resolution 
of the litigation. Appellate Rule 12. 
[2] Appeal and Error 30 iC=842(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVl(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, m 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(1) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
The Supreme Court exercises free review over 
controlling questions of law. 
13] Abatement and Revival 2 iC=52 
2 Abatement and Revival 
2V Death of Party and Revival of Action 
2V(A) Abatement or Survival of Action 
2k5 l Causes of Action Which Survive 
2k52 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Abatement and Revival 2 €;::::::>53 
2 Abatement and Revival 
2V Death of Party and Revival of Action 
2V(A) Abatement or Survival of Action 
2k5 l Causes of Action Which Survive 
2k53 k. Actions on contract. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under the common law, claims arising out of 
contracts generally survive the death of the 
claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate. 
141 Attorney and Client 45 €;::::::>129(1) 
45 Attorney and Client 
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful 
Acts 
45k 129(1) k. In general; limitations. Most 
Cited Cases 
Legal malpractice actions are an amalgam of 
tort and contract theories. 
151 Attorney and Client 45 €;::::::>105.5 
45 Attorney and Client 
4511T Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45kl05.5 k. Elements of malpractice or neg-
ligence action in general. Most Cited Cases 
The tort basis of legal malpractice actions 
flows from the elements of legal malpractice: ( 1) 
the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) 
the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) 
failure to perform the duty; and (4) the negligence 
of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of 
the damage to the client. 
161 Attorney and Client 45 <S::::>106 
45 Attorney and Client 
45TII Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45kl06 k. Nature of attorney's duty. Most 
Cited Cases 
The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a 
client is defined by the purposes for which the at-
torney is retained. 
17] Attorney and Client 45 €;::::::>129(1) 
45 Attorney and Client 
Page 3 of 13 
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45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45kl29 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful 
Acts 
45kl29(1) k. In general; limitations. Most 
Cited Cases 
Breach of an attorney's duty to a client in negli-
gence is a tort. 
[8[ Attorney and Client 45 ~105.5 
45 Attorney and Client 
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k 105.5 k. Elements of malpractice or neg-
ligence action in general. Most Cited Cases 
The contract basis of legal malpractice actions 
is the failure to perform obligations directly spe-
cified in the written contract. 
19] Attorney and Client 45 ~129(1) 
45 Attorney and Client 
45ITI Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45kl29 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful 
Acts 
45k 129(1) k. In general; limitations. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under the abatement rule, breach of an attor-
ney's duty to a client is an action in tort, not con-
tract; that is, unless an attorney foolhardily con-
tracts with his client guaranteeing a specific out-
come in the litigation or provides for a higher 
standard of care in the contract, he is held to the 
standard of care expected of an attorney. 
[101 Attorney and Client 45 ~129(1) 
45 Attorney and Client 
45111 Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful 
Acts 
45 k 129(1) k. In general; limitations. Most 
Cited Cases 
Breach of an attorney's duty to comply with a 
standard of care expected of an attorney is a tort. 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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[q] Abatement and Revival 2 C=52 
2 Abatement and Revival 
2V Death of Party and Revival of Action 
2V(A) Abatement or Survival of Action 
2k5 l Causes of Action Which Survive 
2k52 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Client's legal malpractice action against attor-
ney alleging that attorney breached attorney-client 
relationship sounded in tort, rather than in contract, 
and therefore claim abated upon client's death, 
where the standard of care in the contract between 
the attorney and client was essentially the same as 
in any attorney-client relationship. 
112] Attorney and Client 45 C=I06 
45 Attorney and Client 
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k106 k. Nature of attorney's duty. Most 
Cited Cases 
The contours of the duties owed by an attorney 
to his or her client are defined by the rules of pro-
fessional conduct. 
113) Attorney and Client 45 C=I07 
45 Attorney and Client 
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45kl07 k. Skill and care required. Most Cited 
Cases 
If an attorney and client want to provide for a 
higher standard of care than provided for by the 
rules of professional conduct, they may do so by 
express language in the contract. 
114] Attorney and Client 45 C=I07 
45 Attorney and Client 
45TIT Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k 107 k. Skill and care required. Most Cited 
Cases 
Attorney and Client 45 C=l29(1) 
45 Attorney and Client 
45TII Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
Page 4 of 13 
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45k129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful 
Acts 
45kl29(1) k. In general; limitations. Most 
Cited Cases 
Allegations that attorney breached contingency 
fee agreement, which were the same allegations 
contained in client's legal malpractice claim, could 
not support a breach of contract claim; legal mal-
practice claims sounded in tort, rather than contract, 
and because the contingent fee agreement contained 
no express language providing for a higher standard 
of care, the duty owed by attorney was not defined 
by the contingent fee agreement. 
*1249 Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, Coeur d'Alene, for 
appellants. Michael G. Ramsden argued. 
Elsaesser, Jarzabek, Elliott & McDonald, Chtd., 
Sandpoint, for respondent. Joseph Jarzabek argued. 
W. JONES, Justice. 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Patricia Shelton ("Shelton") filed suit asserting 
breach of contract and legal malpractice based on 
an alleged breach of an attorney-client relationship 
and contingency fee agreement. During the pen-
dency of this action, Shelton passed away. Lois 
Bishop ("Bishop") sought to assert Shelton's claims 
as her personal representative. R. Bruce Owens, 
Jeffrey Crandall, and Owens and Crandall, PLLC 
(herein referred to collectively as "Owens") asser-
ted that the legal malpractice claim abated upon 
Shelton's death and that the breach of contract 
claim did not state a claim. Owens now appeals the 
district court's decision holding that Patricia 
Shelton's claim for legal malpractice did not abate 
upon her death and that Shelton's breach of contract 
action stated a claim. Furthermore, Owens seeks re-
view of the district court's decision granting Lois 
Bishop's Motion to Substitute as Plaintiff. Because 
Patricia Shelton's legal malpractice claim sounds in 
tort and abated upon her death, and her breach of 
contract claim fails to state a claim, the district 
court erred in denying Owens's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and in granting Bishop's Motion to 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Substitute as Plaintiff. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACK-
GROUND 
On February 3, 1997, during the course of her 
employment, Patricia Shelton was involved in an 
automobile accident that left her a quadriplegic. 
The Idaho State Insurance Fund provided her with 
workers' compensation benefits, including medical 
benefits. On September 21, 2006, Shelton was ad-
mitted to North Idaho Advanced Care Hospital 
("Advanced Care") to wean her off of a ventilator 
on which she was dependent. Advanced Care's 
treatment of Shelton resulted in further injury. 
Thereafter, Shelton retained attorney R. Bruce 
Owens to represent her in a medical malpractice 
claim against Advanced Care. Shelton entered into 
an attorney-client relationship with Owens and 
signed a contingent fee contract on December 25, 
2007. 
ln September of 2008, Owens represented 
Shelton in mediation with Advanced Care, Idaho 
State Insurance Fund, and Advanced Care's insurer. 
Shelton's medical malpractice claim was settled on 
February 6, 2009, in the amount of $1,150,000. 
Shelton, as a requirement of the settlement, signed 
the Full Release and Settlement Agreement releas-
ing the hospital and the insurer from liability. After 
deducting costs and Owens's contingency fee, Idaho 
State Insurance Fund sought the remainder of the 
settlement funds in the amount of $664,543.54, cit-
ing its subrogation claim under J.C. § 72-223. 
Idaho State Insurance Fund's subrogation claim was 
later settled in the amount of $270,000. Owens did 
not represent Shelton during the settlement. 
Patricia Shelton alleged that prior to her sign-
ing the Full Release and Settlement Agreement, 
Owens failed to inform her of the consequences of 
the settlement and release in regard to Idaho State 
Insurance Fund's subrogation claim. As a result, 
Shelton filed her legal malpractice and breach of 
contract claims on May 6, 2009, contending that 
Owens breached his duty to inform her of Idaho 
State Insurance Fund's subrogation claim and that 
Page 5 of 13 
Page 4 
the medical malpractice settlement could term in ate 
or reduce payment of compensation benefits paid 
by the Idaho State Insurance Fund. Shelton further 
contended that Owens breached his duty to seek a 
partial lump sum settlement, approved by *1250 the 
Idaho Industrial Commission, settling the subroga-
tion interest in her claim. 
During the pendency of this action, on or 
around November 10, 2009, Shelton passed away. 
Owens later filed and served the Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment on May 6, 2010. Thereafter, on 
May 10, 2010, Shelton's attorney Joseph Jarzabek 
filed its Motion to Substitute as Plaintiff pursuant 
to Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, seeking to appoint Bishop as personal repres-
entative. The district court denied the Second Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment by Memorandum 
Opinion and Order on July 21, 2010. Owens made 
timely application to the district court to appeal by 
permission under I.A.R. 12(b), which was denied. 
On October 20, 2010, this Court granted Owens's 
Motion for Appeal by Permission pursuant to I.A.R. 
12(c). Owens timely filed the Notice of Appeal on 
November 8, 2010. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in determining 
that Patricia Shelton's claim for legal malpractice 
did not abate upon her death? 
2. Whether the district court erred in determining 
that Patricia Shelton's claim for breach of con-
tract stated a claim upon which relief can be 
granted? 
3. Whether the district court erred in ruling that 
Shelton's claim for legal malpractice was not 
barred by the economic loss rule? 
4. Whether the district court erred in granting the 
Motion to Substitute as Plaintiff? 
5. Whether Lois Bishop is entitled to attorney's 
fees on appeal according to J.C. § 12-120(3) and 
LC. § 12-121 in her capacity as personal repres-
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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entative of Patricia Shelton? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2] On October 19, 2010, this Court granted 
Owens's Motion for Appeal by Permission pursuant 
to I.A.R. 12(c). "Generally, an appeal under I.A.R. 
12 will be permitted when the order involves a con-
trolling question of law as to which there is sub-
stantial grounds for difference of opinion and that 
an immediate appeal may materially advance the 
orderly resolution of the litigation." Kindred v. Am-
algamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d 
3 09, 311 ( 1990). As this appeal involves controlling 
questions of law, this Court exercises free review 
over those issues. lnfanger v. City of Salmon, 137 
Idaho 45, 47, 44 P.3d I 100, I 102 (2002). 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Shelton's Claim for Legal Malpractice Abated 
upon Her Death 
[3] The abatement rule holds that in the ab-
sence of a legislative enactment addressing the sur-
vivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. 
See J.C. § 73-1 I 6 ("The common law of England, 
so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, 
the constitution or laws of the United States, in all 
cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is 
the rule of decision in all courts of this state."); see 
also Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210, 215, 
796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990). Under the common law, 
claims arising out of contracts generally survive the 
death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure 
tort abate. See Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667. 
674-79, 34 P.2d 957, 960-61 (I 934); Kloepfer v. 
Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 417-18, 184 P. 477, 477 
(1919). 
The Idaho Legislature addressed whether negli-
gence claims abate in amending J.C. § 5-327(2) to 
provide that negligence claims, including legal mal-
practice claims, do not abate on the death of the in-
jured person. Because the Idaho Legislature failed 
to provide express language of retroactivity, J.C. § 
5-327(2) is inapplicable to the present action, 
which arose prior to the statute's effective date.FNt 
See J.C. § 73-101 (asserting that "[n]o part of these 
Page 6 of 13 
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compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared"); see also Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 
444, 448, 915 P.2d 6, 10 (1996). Thus, this Court's 
ruling is dependent on whether Patricia Shelton's 
legal malpractice claim sounds in pure tort or arises 
out of contract under the common law. *1251 See 
J.C. § 73-116; Helgeson, 54 Idaho at 674-79, 34 
P.2d at 960-61; Kloepfer, 32 Idaho at 417-18, 184 
P. at477. 
FNI. LC. § 5-327(2) was amended effect-
ive July I, 2010. 
This Court previously held that legal malprac-
tice actions sound in tort in the context of attorney's 
fees claims under J.C. § 12-120(3). See Rice v. Lit-
ster, 132 Idaho 897, 980 P.2d 561 (1999); see also 
Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 
(1991). In restricting attorney's fees claims to com-
mercial transactions under J.C. § I 2-120(3), this 
Court held "that an action for legal malpractice is a 
tort action ... even though the underlying transac-
tion which resulted in the malpractice was a 
'commercial transaction .... ' " See Rice, 132 Idaho 
at 901,980 P.2d at 565 (quoting Fuller, 119 Idaho 
at 425, 807 P.2d at 643). Although Rice and Fuller 
have since been overruled regarding their prohibi-
tion of J.C. § 12-120(3) attorney's fees claims in 
the context of legal malpractice actions, this Court 
recognized that they were not overruled on the 
characterization of legal malpractice actions as 
sounding in tort. See City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 
Idaho 656, 664---65, 201 P.3d 629, 637-38 (2009) 
(holding that commercial transactions under § 
12-120(3) are not limited to contract actions and 
may include legal malpractice tort actions even in 
the absence of an attorney-client contract); see also 
Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 256 P.3d 730 
(2011) (holding that legal malpractice actions 
sound in tort, but J.C. § 12-120(3) only requires 
that there be a commercial transaction, which may 
be satisfied with the establishment of an attorney-cli-
ent relationship). 
[4][5][6][7][8][9][10] As this Court previously 
recognized, "[l]egal malpractice actions are an am-
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algam of tort and contract theories." See Johnson v. 
Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654 
( 1982). The tort basis of legal malpractice actions 
flows from the elements of legal malpractice: "(a) 
the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (b) 
the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) 
failure to perform the duty; and (d) the negligence 
of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of 
the damage to the client.. .. " Id. (quoting Sherry v. 
Diercks, 29 Wash.App. 433, 437, 628 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (1981 )). "The scope of an attorney's contrac-
tual duty to a client is defined by the purposes for 
which the attorney is retained." .Johnson, 103 Idaho 
at 704, 652 P.2d at 652; Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425, 
807 P.2d at 643 (holding that the tort of legal mal-
practice is also a breach of the attorney-client rela-
tionship). Breach of an attorney's duty in negli-
gence is a tort. See Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 
Idaho I 34, l 36, 90 P.3 d 884, 886 (2004); Johnson, 
103 Idaho at 704, 706--07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55. 
The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is 
the failure to perform obligations directly specified 
in the written contract. See Johnson, 103 Idaho at 
704, 706--07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55 (holding that 
a breach of contract claim would arise if the attor-
ney did not do what he promised to do in the con-
tract, e.g., failing to draw up a contract of sale). 
Thus, under the abatement rule, breach of duty is an 
action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an attor-
ney foolhardily contracts with his client guarantee-
ing a specific outcome in the litigation or provides 
for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is 
held to the standard of care expected of an attorney. 
Breach of that duty is a tort. 
[11][12][13] As further elaborated by Justice 
Jim Jones in his special concurrence, the contours 
of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her cli-
ent are defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct. If an attorney and client want to provide 
for a higher standard of care, they may do so by ex-
press language in the contract. Here, the standard of 
care in the contract is essentially the same as in any 
attorney-client relationship. Because this claim 
sounds in tort, it abated upon Patricia Shelton's 
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death. 
Owens also asserts that the personal nature of 
the attorney-client relationship suggests that legal 
malpractice claims are not assignable and, there-
fore, abate under Macleod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 
75, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926). This Court need not 
specifically address this issue because Shelton's 
legal malpractice claim abated. 
B. Patricia Shelton's Breach of Contract Claim 
Fails to State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be 
Granted 
[14] Owens relies on Trimming v. Howard, 52 
Idaho 412. 16 P.2d 661 (1932), and *1252 Hayward 
v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 33 P.3d 
816 (200 l ), in asserting that the district court erred 
in holding that Patricia Shelton may bring her legal 
malpractice and breach of contract claims in the 
same cause of action. Bishop asserts that Hayward 
is inapplicable because it relates to medical mal-
practice claims and was based on a statute that 
strictly required all actions related to medical care 
to be pursued in the context of the local standard of 
care. See Hayward, 136 Idaho at 349-51, 33 P.3d at 
823-25. 
Trimming and Hayward were actions where the 
plaintiffs tried to assert contract claims in medical 
malpractice suits in order to avoid the statute of 
limitations defense applicable to tort claims. Id.; 
Trimming, 52 Idaho at 415-17, 16 P.2d at 662-63. 
Specifically, this Court rejected such claims, assert-
ing that they pertain to "the provision of or failure 
to provide health care" under J.C. § 6--1012. Hay-
ward, 136 Idaho at 349-50, 33 P.3d at 823-24 
(quoting I.C. § 6-1012). This Court affirmed the 
claims as malpractice tort actions, "regardless of 
the label assigned to them." Id. at 350, 33 P.3d at 
824. Thus, Owens contends that where legal mal-
practice actions based on breach of duty are asser-
ted, not based on any obligations or undertakings 
specifically provided in a contract, a claim in tort 
remains the sole cause of action. See Trimming, 52 
Idaho at 415-17, 16 P.2d at 662-63; Hayward, 136 
Idaho at 349-50, 33 P.3d at 823-24. 
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Although the medical malpractice cases on 
which Owens relies are governed by a specific stat-
ute, the fact that a proponent labels his or her action 
as sounding in contract as well as malpractice does 
not make the underlying action contract. The 
"theory" of relief sought is not different. A holding 
to the contrary would create a per se breach of con-
tract action in every legal malpractice action. Legal 
malpractice has traditionally been treated as the 
proper claim where an attorney breaches his or her 
duty, which arises from the attorney-client relation-
ship. 
As noted in the previous section, because the 
contingent fee agreement in this matter contained 
no express language providing for a higher standard 
of care, the duty owed by Owens is not defined by 
the contingent fee agreement. The language in the 
contingent fee agreement that "[ a ]ttomeys shal I 
represent Client in said matter and do all things ne-
cessary, appropriate, or advisable, in regard 
thereto" is not materially different from the stand-
ard applied in the legal malpractice claim. Thus, 
this action is really a legal malpractice claim dis-
guised as a contract claim. A person cannot change 
a tort action into a contract action simply by la-
beling it as such. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 350, 33 
P.3d at 824. 
As previously discussed, professional malprac-
tice actions traditionally have been characterized as 
tort actions in the context of the statute of limita-
tions. To hold that this claim is clearly a separate 
contract cause of action would render the two year 
statute of limitations applying to legal malpractice 
actions moot. See Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 
582, 585-87, 51 P.3d 396, 399-401 (2002). It 
would also call into question matters such as the 
standard of care regarding legal malpractice ac-
tions, which is to comply with the local standard of 
care by an attorney, as well as the application of the 
economic loss rule to legal malpractice claims. 
Therefore, this Court holds that Bishop's 
breach of contract claim, which asserts the same 
claim as the legal malpractice theory, which has 
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traditionally been treated as the proper claim, fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
C. The Issue Whether Shelton's Claim for Legal 
Malpractice Is Barred by the Economic Loss 
Rule Does Not Need to be Addressed Because 
Shelton's Claim for Legal Malpractice Abated 
In the Notice of Appeal, Owens argues that the 
district court erred in ruling that Shelton's claim for 
legal malpractice is not barred by the economic loss 
rule. This issue does not need to be addressed be-
cause Shelton's claim for legal malpractice abated 
upon her death. 
D. Th e Sub stitution o f Lois B is hop as Personal 
Representative for Patricia Shelton Was Im-
proper Because Shelton's Claim Extinguished as 
per I.R.C.P. 25(a)(1) 
The basis of Owens's contention that the dis-
trict court erred in allowing the substitution *l 253 
of Lois Bishop is that substitution of the parties un-
der l.R.C.P. 25(a)(l) is only applicable "[i]f a party 
dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished .... " 
Since the legal malpractice claim abated and the 
contract claim failed to state an independent action, 
the district court erred in allowing the substitution 
of Bishop. 
E. Bishop ls Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees Un-
der J.C. § 12-120(3) and LC. § 12-121 
Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and Idaho Code 
section 12-121 apply to prevailing parties in a civil 
action. Bishop is not the prevailing party in this ac-
tion. Therefore, this Court denies Bishop's attor-
ney's fees claims under J.C. § 12-120(3) and 1.C. § 
12-121. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Patricia Shelton's legal malpractice claim 
abated upon her death, and her breach of contract 
claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. Therefore, the Motion to Substitute as 
Plaintiff was improperly granted under J.R.C.P. 
25(a)(1 ). Bishop is not entitled to attorney's fees be-
cause she is not the prevailing party. 
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The judgment of the district court is reversed. 
Appellants did not request attorney fees. Costs are 
awarded to the Appellants. 
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justice EISMANN 
concur. 
J. JONES, J., specially concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion but write to 
make some additional observations regarding the 
matters at issue. 
Characterizing a breach of duty action against 
an attorney has never been easy because, by defini-
tion, an attorney-client relationship arises out of 
some fonn of contract, but a lawyer's duty of care, 
which by implication becomes a part of that con-
tract, is not necessarily spelled out in the contract 
tenns agreed upon by the parties. A lawyer's duty to 
a client is established by professional obligations 
developed by the Idaho State Bar and this Court. 
The contours of an Idaho lawyer's duty of care are 
generally spelled out in the Idaho Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (l.R.P.C.). "An attorney's duty 
arises out of the contract between the attorney and 
his or her client." Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 
134, 137, 90 P.3d 884, 887 (2004). The things an 
attorney is obligated to do for a client depend on 
the type of matter or proceeding that the attorney 
undertakes for the client. The attorney is obligated 
to observe the duty of care attendant to such matter 
or proceeding. An attorney may not make a contract 
with the client to limit compliance with his duty of 
care, except as authorized by the I.R.P.C., such as 
obtaining infonned consent to reveal confidential 
client infonnation (l.R.P.C. l .6(a)) or obtaining in-
fonned consent to represent clients with conflicting 
interests (l.R.P.C. l .7(b)(4)). 
As the Court notes in its Opinion, a lawyer can 
agree to do things or perfonn tasks above and bey-
ond those provided for in, and not prohibited by, 
the I.R.P.C. Such additional undertakings are not 
required by the l.R.P.C. or the lawyer's general duty 
of care and, therefore, are strictly contractual in 
nature. Such undertakings should be enforceable in 
a contract action and should survive the death of 
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the client, just as any other contractual obligation. 
For instance, I.R.P.C. 1.5 spells out the general 
requirements pertaining to fees charged by attor-
neys, but the rule does not spell out the specific 
provisions that must be written into the fee agree-
ment. I.R.P.C. 1.5 states the general contours of 
what an attorney may do and what the attorney 
must not do. Violation of I.R.P.C. 1.5 may give rise 
to a tort action for malpractice. Violation of the 
specific tenns of the agreement made between the 
lawyer and the client, where there is no claim that 
the provisions of I.R.P.C. 1.5 were violated, gives 
rise to a contract action. 
In this case, the breach of contract claim is 
couched in tenns of Owens having violated his con-
tractual duty to Shelton. It is claimed that Owens 
failed to adequately infonn Shelton about the oper-
ation of J.C. § 72-223, resulting in the fact that 
Shelton might end up with nothing if the Idaho 
State Insurance Fund exercised its full right of sub-
rogation. Owens was required to adequately infonn 
*l 254 Shelton in this regard but that duty arose un-
der l.R.P.C. I .4, rather than the Contingent Fee 
Contract (Contract) between the parties. In her 
briefing, Bishop also contends that Owens specific-
ally violated paragraph I of the Contract, providing 
that, "[Owens' finn] shall represent [Shelton] in 
said manner and do all things necessary, appropri-
ate, or advisable, in regard thereto, whether the 
same be by representation in legal proceedings or 
otherwise." However, these are obligations that 
Owens had under I.R.P.C. I. I and 1.3. Since the al-
leged breaches of duty for which Shelton sued 
Owens are duties emanating from the I.R.P.C., the 
action is tort in nature. 
Had Shelton sued Owens for violating the spe-
cific fee provisions of the Contract, whereby she 
agreed to pay Owens "forty percent (40%) of the 
gross recovery of any and all funds received in set-
tlement or recovered after filing an action in any 
Court," a contract action would have been appropri-
ate. It appears from the record that Owens took a 
fee of $460,000 off of the top of the $1,150,000 set-
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tlement with Advance Care, representing 40% of 
the total settlement, along with reimbursing himself 
for $25,456.46 in costs. That left a total of 
$664,543.54, all of which (and much more) was 
subject to the Insurance Fund's subrogated claim. 
Other counsel negotiated a reduction of the subrog-
ated claim down to $270,000, leaving a balance of 
$394,543.54. There is no indication as to whether 
such other counsel charged an additional fee for 
such negotiation with the Insurance Fund, nor is 
there any indication as to whether any portion of 
the $460,000 fee obtained by Owens was taken into 
account as the Insurance Fund's responsibility for 
the Advance Care settlement under a common fund 
theory. The record does not disclose how the bal-
ance was distributed. Shelton possibly could have 
made the claim that Owens' fee should have been 
calculated on some amount other than $1,150,000, 
where he obviously knew that the subrogated claim 
would greatly exceed any amount left after he ob-
tained the full amount of his fee. However, the con-
tract claim pursued by Shelton, and then Bishop, 
did not involve this contractual question so no valid 
contact claim was presented on appeal. 
HORTON, J., dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the Court's conclu-
sion that Shelton's claim abated upon her death. I 
do so because I believe that her claim of breach of 
contract stated a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, and therefore, the cause of action did not 
abate. 
This Court has long recognized that the duties 
owed in tort cases are those imposed by law, and do 
not have their origins in the explicit terms of the 
parties' contract_FN2 Recently, in Weinstein v. 
Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 
299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010), this Court addressed an 
earlier decision in Inland Group of Companies, Inc. 
v. Providence Washington lnrnrance Co., 133 
Idaho 249, 985 P.2d 674 (1999). In Inland Group, 
the Court upheld an award of punitive damages for 
the tort of bad faith where the insurance company 
had failed to timely pay the undisputed portion of a 
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claim. Id. at 259, 985 P.2d at 684. Although the in-
surance policy at issue contained an arbitration pro-
vision relating to disputed claims, this Court rejec-
ted the insurer's claim that it had no duty to pay un-
der the policy until the insured complied with all 
provisions of the policy including arbitration. Id. at 
255-56, 985 P.2d at 680-8 I. Weinstein explained 
the reasons for this decision as follows: 
FN2. In this regard, I take issue with the 
majority's reliance on Johnson v. Jones, 
103 Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650 (1982), for 
the proposition that "[t]he contract basis of 
legal malpractice actions is the failure to 
perform obligations directly specified in 
the written contract." However, Johnson 
cannot be said to hold that an attorney's 
negligent breach of the express terms of a 
written contract is only actionable in tort 
because in Johnson there was no written 
contract. Rather, the Court in Johnson 
noted that it was "undisputed that [the at-
torney] never spoke with the [plaintiffs] or 
affirmatively stated that he would repres-
ent them." Id. at 703, 652 P.2d at 651. In-
deed, the Court noted that "the earnest 
money agreement is admittedly vague as to 
what the attorney's fees that the parties 
were to 'share equally in' would pur-
chase .... " Id. at 704 n. 2, 652 P.2d at 652 n. 
2. The Court concluded that the attorney 
"was retained solely to draw up a contract 
of sale." Id. 
In rejecting that argument we stated, "The duty 
to act in good faith exists at all *1255 times dur-
ing the settlement process. Furthermore, a claim 
for breach of the obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing is independent of a technical breach of 
the obligation to pay. " [Inland Group, 133 Idaho] 
at 255, 985 P.2d at 680. We added, "The tort re-
cognized by this Court in White [v. Unigard Mu-
tual Insurance Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d I 014 
(I 986) ] is grounded upon the breach of this inde-
pendent implied contractual duty of good faith. It 
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cannot be properly regarded as a claim for tor-
tious breach of the explicit terms of the contract 
such as the duty to pay. " 133 Idaho at 255, 985 
P.2d at 680. 
149 Idaho at 322, 233 P.3d at 1244 (emphasis 
added). 
In Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc., 145 
Idaho 346, 179 P.3d 309 (2008), this Court ex-
plained the interplay between contract and tort ac-
tions in similar tenns: 
In addition, "[i]n order for a cause of action to 
arise in tort, Claimants must establish the breach 
of a tort duty, separate and apart from any duty 
allegedly created by the contract." Vickers [ v. 
Hanover Constr. Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 832, 835, 
875 P.2d 929, 932 (I 994) ]. Furthennore, 
"negligent conduct and breach of contract are two 
distinct theories of recovery. Ordinarily, breach 
of contract is not a tort, although a contract may 
create the circumstances for the commission of a 
tort." Just's Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 
Idaho 462, 468, 583 P.2d 997, 1003 (1978). But, 
"[t]he mere negligent breach or n onperformance 
of a contract will not sustain an action sounding 
in to rt, in the absence of a liability imposed by 
law independent of that arising out of the con-
tract itself " Steiner Corp. v. Am. Dist. Tel., 106 
Idaho 787, 790, 683 P.2d 435, 438 (I 984) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
145 Idaho at 350, 179 P.3d at 313 (emphasis 
added). 
In Baccus, Justice Warren Jones continued, 
emphasizing that tort duties arise by operation of 
law, whereas contractual duties arise from the mu-
tual assumption of rights and duties by the contract-
ing parties: 
ln Just's, this Court explained the difference 
between the purposes of contract law and tort law 
thusly: 
The fundamental difference between tort and 
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contract lies in the nature of the interests pro-
tected. Tort actions are created to protect the 
interest in freedom from various kinds of harm. 
The duties of conduct which give rise to them 
are imposed by the law, and are based primar-
ily upon social policy, and not necessarily upon 
the will or intention of the parties.... Contract 
actions are created to protect the interest in 
having promises perfonned. Contract obliga-
tions are imposed because of conduct of the 
parties manifesting consent, and are owed only 
to the specific individuals named in the con- tract. 
Just's, 99 Idaho at 468, 583 P.2d at I 003 (quoting 
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 92 at 
613 (4th ed.1971)). 
Id at 350-511, 179 P.3d at 313-14 (emphasis 
added). 
In Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 797 P.2d 
1322 (I 990), this Court similarly emphasized that 
the source of a duty in tort is not found within the 
tenns of the parties' contract. The Court quoted its 
earlier decision in Carroll v. United Steelworkers of 
America, 107 Idaho 717, 719, 692 P.2d 361, 363 
(1984), which held that "an alleged failure to per-
fonn a contractual obligation is not actionable in 
tort .... 'To found an action in tort, there must be a 
breach of duty apart from non-performance of a 
contract.'" 118 Idaho at 478,797 P.2d at 1326 
(internal citations omitted, emphasis original). Even 
prior to Carroll, this Court repeatedly made similar 
pronouncements. See Steiner Corp., I 06 Idaho at 
790-91, 683 P.2d at 438-39 ("a clear duty must be 
shown to exist by operation of law, separate and 
apart from the contractual duty .... "); Taylor v. 
Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138, 483 P.2d 664, 669 
(1971) ("Ordinarily, a breach of contract is not a 
tort. A contract may, however, create a state of 
things which furnishes the occasion for a tort."); 
Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 
486-87, 174 P. 1009, 1010 (1918) ("to detennine 
the fonn in which redress must be sought, it is ne-
cessary to ascertain source or origin. If * 1256 it be 
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found that right or duty was created independent of 
the consent of the parties concerned, the action is in 
tort; if because of such consent, it is on contract."). 
In Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 137, 
90 P.3d 884, 887 (2004), this Court stated that "[a]n 
attorney's duty arises out of the contract between 
the attorney and his or her client." We have re-
cently reiterated this language from Harrigfeld in 
Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 326, 256 P.3d 
730, 734 (2011). However, the holding in Harrig-
(eld was not based upon the express terms of the at-
torney-client contract; rather, the Court noted that 
the existence of a duty was a question of law. 140 
Idaho at 138, 90 P.3d at 888. In determining wheth-
er a duty would be imposed by operation of law, the 
Court then conducted a balance-of-the-harms test. Id 
I do not think that Hayward v. Valley Vista 
Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 33 P.3d 816 (2001), 
discussed by the majority, provides guidance for 
resolution of the instant appeal. Although the Hay-
ward Court addressed the holding in Trimming v. 
Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932), its de-
cision that plaintiff was precluded from bringing a 
contract action against a health care provider was 
based upon an application of I.C. § 6-1012. Id at 
350, 33 P.3d at 824. In Trimming, th is Court did 
make the following statement, which sounds much 
like the holding of the majority in the present case: 
"Respondent is not arraigned for breach of contract, 
but for delinquencies incidental to its performance. 
As alleged, these are the very foundation of the ac-
tion, and, if true, constituted nothing but malprac-
tice. The gist of a malpractice action is negligence, 
not a breach of the contract of employment." 52 
Idaho at 416, 16 P.2d at 662. 
However, this statement followed a traditional 
statement, along the lines previously discussed, dis-
tinguishing the sources of duties imposed in tort 
and contract cases: 
The complaint primarily alleges that a contract 
for treatment was entered into between the 
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parties. So far so good. But, in the performance 
of that contract, respondent impliedly contracted 
that he would exercise ordinary and reasonable 
care (48 CJ. 1115, par. IOI), the [sic] which is 
another way of saying that such duty is imposed 
by law. Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316, 55 P. 
1000, I 002 [ (I 899) ], enunciating as follows: 
The contract of employment has nothing 
whatever to do with the liability, except to cre-
ate a duty on the part of the employer,-a duty 
not expressed in the contract, and for the viola-
tion of which the contract of employment fur-
nishes no rule or standard for the estimation of 
damages. Nor is the action grounded upon the 
contract, but upon the duty springing from the 
relation created by it, viz., that of employer and 
employee, and under the old system of pleading 
was always classed as an action ex delicto. 
Id. at 415, 16 P.2d at 662 (emphasis added). 
Based upon the foregoing, I believe that the 
body of law discussed both in the majority opinion 
and in this dissent recognizes that the duties im-
posed by operation of law in malpractice actions 
flow from the relationship created by the contractu-
al relationship of the parties, not the contract itself. 
In this case, Owens specifically undertook and 
promised that "[a]ttorneys shall represent Client in 
said matter and do all things necessary, appropriate, 
or advisable, in regard thereto." There is no sugges-
tion that Owens was incompetent or otherwise 
lacked the capacity to contract. There is likewise no 
suggestion that he was unaware of the nature of his 
undertaking (after all, it was his firm's form con-
tract), or that he did not voluntarily enter into the 
agreement, or that there was no consideration for 
his promise. In the absence of such circumstances 
as might permit avoidance of the terms of an ex-
press contract, I am unaware of any prior instance 
where this Court has determined that a party may 
be relieved of liability for the breach of an express 
term of a written contract on the basis that the 
"wrong theory" was advanced by plaintiff. 
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The majority expresses its concern that "[a] 
holding to the contrary would create a per se breach 
of contract action in every legal malpractice ac-
tion." I would first note *1257 that this is a gross 
overstatement. The position I espouse only applies 
in instances involving express contractual undertak-
ings. In this case, no one forced Owens to enter a 
contract prescribing the manner in which he would 
represent his client. Had he not elected to identify 
the manner in which he would perform his services, 
his duty to his client would have been imposed by 
law, this action would sound in tort, and I would be 
joining with the majority. 
I, too, have concern for the result of this ap-
peal. There is the very real concern that the de-
cision of this Court will reinforce the perception, 
shared by many in our society, that courts will go 
out of their way in order to protect members of the 
bar,FNJ My position, which I believe to be well-
grounded in existing law, simply recognizes that 
lawyers do not hold a special place in society that 
insulates them from the type of liability that any 
other party to a contract would face. 
FN3. This perception may well evaporate 
when trial courts begin to instruct juries in 
legal malpractice cases that the attorney's 
duty is to "do all things necessary, appro-
priate or advisable, in regard" to the sub-
ject of representation. Based upon the ma-
jority's statement that this is "not materi-
ally different from the standard applied in 
the legal malpractice claim," it appears that 
such an instruction would be appropriate. 
For these reasons, I would affirm the decision 
of the district court and hold that Shelton stated a 
claim for breach of contract upon which relief can 
be granted. As the majority correctly notes, a claim 
arising ex contractu survives the death of the 
claimant. Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 418, 184 
P. 477, 477 (1919). Accordingly, I dissent from the 
Court's determination that the action abated and the 
case should be remanded for dismissal. 
Idaho,2012. 
Bishop v. Owens 
152 Idaho 616,272 P.3d 1247 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, May 2010 Tenn. 
Marcie Rae HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, dba American Family Insurance, a 
foreign insurance corporation licensed to do busi-
ness in the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 36311. 
Jan. 5, 2011. 
Rehearing Denied April 29, 2011. 
Background: Insured, who had been involved in 
car accident with tortfeasor, filed suit against her 
underinsured motorist (UIM) insurer, after insurer 
denied her claim for UIM benefits, alleging breach 
of contract and fraud. Parties filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment. The District Court, Ban-
nock County, Stephen S. Dunn, J., granted sum-
mary judgment to insurer. Insured appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, W. Jones, J., held 
that: 
(1) exhaustion clause in UIM policy, requiring in-
sured to deplete all of the tortfeasor's bodily injury 
insurance before she could collect UIM benefits, 
was void, but 
(2) insured was not entitled to appellate attorney fees. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Eismann, C.J., dissented, with opinion, m 
which Horton, J., concurred. 
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**814 Johnson Olson Chartered, Pocatello, for Ap-
pellant. L. Charles Johnson argued. 
Trout, Jones, Gledhill Fuhrman, PA., Boise, for Re-
spondent. Christopher P. Graham argued. 
W. JONES, Justice. 
*621 I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this case, an underinsured-motorist claimant 
asks this Court to invalidate an "exhaustion clause" 
requiring her to exhaust the full limits of the tort-
feasor's insurance policy before being eligible for 
underinsured-motorist benefits. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACK-
GROUND 
Marcie Hill, the appellant, was injured in a 
two-car accident with Andrea Hamilton in Novem-
ber of 2005. Andrea, who was fifteen years old, 
was talking on a cell phone when she unexpectedly 
turned her vehicle left in front of Hill's, who was 
approaching in the opposing lane of traffic. Hill 
suffered injuries to her back and to her knee. Al-
though she has received medical treatment, Hill 
claims that she still suffers from knee pain and loss 
of mobility for which she needs arthroscopic sur-
gery. 
At the time of the accident, Andrea's car was 
covered by an automobile-insurance policy held by 
her parents, Joseph and Jacqueline Hamilton. The 
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Hamiltons' policy provided for up to $25,000 in 
bod ily-inj urycoverage. Hi l lhadanunderinsured-motor-
ist ("VIM") policy with American Family Mutual 
Insurance Company ("American Family"), the re-
spondent, for up to $100,000 per person. The policy 
contained an "exhaustion clause" requiring her to 
deplete all of the tortfeasor's bodily-injury insur-
ance before she could collect underinsurance bene-
fits. 
Hill filed suit against the Hamiltons but settled 
for $1000 less than the Hamiltons' $25,000 policy 
I imits rather than litigating the case. She then asser-
ted a c !aim for an additional $18,000 against Amer-
ican Family, an amount that included credit for the 
$1000 that she did not collect from the tortfeasor. 
American Family nonetheless denied the claim be-
cause Hill had not yet "exhausted" the tortfeasor's 
bodily-injury policy. Hill then filed this lawsuit 
against American Family alleging breach of con-
tract and fraud and the parties submitted cross-
motions for summary judgment. The district court 
granted summary judgment to American Family, 
finding that the exhaustion clause unambiguously 
required Hill to exhaust the Hamiltons' bodily-in-
jury policy limits before she could receive UIM be-
nefits. The court also found there to be no counter-
vailing public policy in Idaho that overrides the 
plain language of the contract and allows Hill to re-
cover. On appeal, Hill contends that because in-
surers are now statutorily mandated *622 **815 to 
offer UIM coverage in Idaho, the exhaustion clause 
offends public policy by requiring her to litigate her 
claim against the Hamiltons before being eligible to 
receive benefits. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court properly granted 
summary judgment to American Family on 
Hill's claim for UIM benefits. 
2. Whether Hill is entitled to attorney fees on 
appeal. 
IV. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3][4] This Court applies the same stand-
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ard as the district court when reviewing a grant of a 
motion for summary judgment. Shawver v. Huckle-
beny Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 
685, 691 (2004). Since filing cross-motions for 
summary judgment does not change the standard of 
review, the Court evaluates each motion on its mer-
its. Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 206, 998 
P.2d 1118, 1119 (2000). Summary judgment is 
proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any mater-
ial fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "This 
Court will liberally construe the record in favor of 
the party opposing the motion for summary judg-
ment and will draw all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions in favor of that party." Arreguin v. 
Farmers ins. Co., 145 Idaho 459, 461, 180 P.3d 
498, 500 (2008). The entire record is freely re-
viewed to determine if either side was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law and to de-
tenn ine whether inferences drawn by the district 
court are reasonably supported by the record. Pot-
latch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 Idaho 
630,634,226 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Exhaustion Clause Is Void as Contrary to 
Public Policy 
The dispositive issue here is whether American 
Family may rely on an exhaustion clause to deny 
Hill's UIM benefits solely because she settled for 
just under the tortfeasor's policy limits. The thrust 
of Hill's appeal is that the exhaustion clause contra-
venes Idaho's public policy of requiring U!M cover-
age, which is embodied in l.C. § 41-2502(1 ). Sec-
tion 41-2502(1) requires all insurance carriers to 
offer UIM coverage with their policies. FNi Hill 
argues that this Court should adopt the doctrine of 
"constructive exhaustion" to allow her to collect 
UIM benefits above the tortfeasors' policy limits 
even if she settles for less than those limits. Amer-
ican Family responds that Idaho case law creates no 
public policy with respect to UIM claims. 
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FNl. This provision provides in relevant part: 
[N]o owner's or operator's policy of mo-
tor vehicle liability insurance ... shall be 
delivered or issued for delivery in this 
state with respect to any motor vehicle 
registered or principally garaged in this 
state unless coverage is provided therein 
or supplemental thereto ... for the protec-
tion of persons insured thereunder who 
are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of uninsured 
and underinsured motor vehicles be-
cause of bodily injury, sickness or dis-
ease, including death, resulting there- from. 
J.C. § 41-2502(1) (emphasis added rep-
resenting the 2008 amendment). 
I. The Exhaustion Clause Unambiguously Requires 
Hill to Exhaust the Tortfeasor's Insurance Policy 
[5][6][7] A preliminary issue is to determine 
the legal effect of the exhaustion clause. A contract 
must be interpreted according to the plain meaning 
of the words used if the language is clear and un-
ambiguous. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho 
Farm Bureau ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 
P.3d 751, 754 (2005). An insurance policy is am-
biguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different 
interpretations. Armstrong v. Farmers ins. Co., 143 
Idaho 135, 137, 139 P.3d 737, 739 (2006). This 
Court freely reviews the question of whether an in-
surance contract is ambiguous. Clark v. Prudential 
Prop. & Cas. ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 
242, 245 (2003). 
[8] Hill does not dispute that the UIM provi-
sion is clear. It reads: 
**816 *623 We will pay compensatory dam-
ages for bodily injury which an insured person is 
legally entitled to recover from the owner or op-
erator of an underinsured motor vehicle .... 
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We will pay under this coverage only after the 
limits of liability under any bodily liability bonds 
or policies have been exhausted by payment of 
judgments or settlements. 
This language is boilerplate in the insurance in-
dustry, and a number of other jurisdictions have 
found virtually identical wordings to be unambigu-
ous. E.g. Robinette v. Am. liberty Ins. Co., 720 
F.Supp. 577, 579 (S.D.Miss.1989); Birchfield v. 
Nationwide Ins., 317 Ark. 38, 875 S.W.2d 502, 503 
(1994). The clause explicitly creates a condition 
precedent to UIM benefits, entitling Hill to cover-
age only if she settles or receives a payment for the 
tortfeasor's policy limits. See Maroun v. Wyreless 
Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P.3d 974, 984 
(2005) ("A condition precedent is an event not cer-
tain to occur, but which must occur, before per-
formance under a contract becomes due." 
( quotation omitted)). 
2. Exhaustion Clauses in U!M Insurance Contracts 
Are Void Because They Violate Idaho State Public 
Policy 
[9][10][11][12][13] Next, this Court must de-
termine whether the exhaustion clause violates pub-
lic policy, which is a question of law. Quiring v. 
Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 566, 944 P.2d 695, 701 
(1997). The "liberty of contract is not an absolute 
and unlimited right, but upon the contrary is always 
subservient to the public welfare." J.F. v. D.B., I 16 
Ohio St.3d 363, 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (2007) 
(citation omitted). "[T]he courts will not hesitate to 
declare void as against public policy contractual 
provisions which clearly tend to the injury of the 
public in some way." 17 A C.J.S. Contracts § 218 
(2010). "The usual test applied by courts in determ-
ining whether a contract offends public policy and 
is antagonistic to the public interest is whether the 
contract has a tendency toward such an evil." Ste-
arns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 283, 240 P.2d 833, 
837 (1952) (emphasis added). "Public policy may 
be found and set forth in the statutes, judicial de-
cisions or the constitution." Bakker v. Thunder 
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Spring-Wareham, l.l.C., 141 Idaho 185, 189, 108 
P.3d 332, 336 (2005). Whether an insurance con-
tract is against public policy "is to be determined 
from all the facts and circumstances of each case." 
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, I 00 Idaho 883, 887, 
606 P .2d 987, 991 (1980). In addition, "analogous 
cases involving the same general principles may be 
looked to by the court in arriving at a satisfactory 
conclusion." Smith v. Idaho Hosp. Serv., 89 Idaho 
499, 504, 406 P.2d 696, 699 (1965). 
[ 14] American Family is correct in that, as of 
yet, Idaho case law has only held that "[n]either the 
Idaho legislature nor the courts have declared that 
there exists a public policy applicable to under-
insured motorist coverage." Meeker/ v. Transamer-
ica Ins. Co., 108 Idaho 597, 600, 701 P.2d 217,220 
(1985); accord Er/and v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 136 
Idaho 131, 133, 30 P.3d 286,288 (2001). The Court 
repeatedly indicated, however, that the sole reason 
there was no clear public policy regarding UIM 
coverage was because "Idaho statutes do not regu-
late underinsured motorist coverage." Andrae v. 
Idaho Counties Risk Mgmt. Prag. Underwriters, 
145 Idaho 33, 36, 175 P.3d 195, 198 (2007) (citing 
Meeker/, I 08 Idaho at 600, 701 P.2d at 220). We 
have rejected public policy challenges related to 
UIM policies only because "our statutes do not re-
quire an automobile insurer to include underinsured 
vehicle coverage in its policies or even to offer this 
coverage to its insureds." Farmers Ins. Co. v. Buffa, 
119 Idaho 345, 347, 806 P.2d 438, 440 (1991); see 
also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scarlett, 116 Idaho 
820, 822, 780 P .2d 142, 144 (1989) (same). 
In 2008, however, the Legislature did begin to 
require insurers to offer UIM coverage. It amended 
J.C. § 41-2502(1) to expressly require insurance 
companies to offer such provisions with automobile 
policies. Act of March 5, 2008, ch. 69, § I, 2008 
Idaho Sess. Laws 183, 183. Insureds now may only 
refuse this coverage if they do so in writing. Id 
( codified at LC. § 41-2502(2)). The amendment re-
quires insurers to offer protection against 
"underinsured motor vehicles," *624 **817 defined 
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as vehicles insured with limits at least at the stat-
utory minimum for bodily injury or death.FN2 § 2, 
2008 IDAHO SESS. LAWS At 184 (coDified at i.e. 
§ 41-2503(2)). The Legislature accordingly intends 
to protect Idaho's citizens from drivers carrying 
policies above the statutorily required policy levels 
but who have insurance insufficient to compensate 
their tort victims. 
FN2. The minimum amount of required in-
surance is $25,000 per person and $50,000 
per accident. LC. § 49-117( 18). Subject to 
some limited exceptions, nobody may op-
erate a motor vehicle on public highways 
in Idaho without carrying the statutory 
minimum amount of liability insurance. id 
§ 49-1428(1). 
The Legislature apparently enacted the amend-
ment for two reasons. First, the most obvious is the 
threat that underinsured motorists pose to public 
safety. Idahoans suffering catastrophic injuries 
from drivers carrying insufficient coverage could 
find themselves without redress if they have no 
UIM policy. 
Second, without UIM coverage, Idahoans in-
jured by a totally uninsured driver sometimes re-
cover more than those injured by underinsured 
drivers. Many drivers in Idaho injured by under-
insured motorists had little recourse if they pur-
chased uninsured-motorist ("UM") policies but had 
no UIM coverage, since those policies provided no 
benefits if the underinsured tortfeasor had at least 
the minimum required amount of insurance cover-
age. As this Court observed before the Legislature 
implemented the UIM mandate, many drivers in 
this state "may well be in a better position if a tort-
feasor carries no insurance whatsoever rather than 
carrying the minimum coverage mandated by the 
statute," and that "the matter deserves legislative 
attention." Blackburn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., l 08 Idaho 85, 90, 697 P.2d 425, 430 (l 985); 
see also Longworth, 538 A.2.d at 424 (stating that 
there is no reason why UM claimants should have 
immediate recourse against their insurer but not 
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UIM claimants). The Legislature has addressed this 
anomaly by mandating insurers to at least offer 
UIM coverage in all insurance policies. 
[15] Before analyzing the public-policy issue 
further, however, it is necessary to note that the 
Director of the Department of Insurance presum-
ably approved the terms in Hill's insurance policy. 
Absent an assertion to the contrary, this Court pre-
sumes that the insurance policy was submitted to 
the Director and was found to comport with public 
policy. Am. Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 
394, 399, 94 P.3d 699, 704 (2004). The Legislature 
has empowered the Director to invalidate an insur-
ance policy for a number of reasons, including be-
cause it contains "any inconsistent, ambiguous, or 
misleading clauses, or exceptions and conditions 
which deceptively affect the risk purported to be as-
sumed in the general coverage of the contract, or 
which are unfairly prejudicial to the policy holder." 
J.C. § 41-1813(2). Hill does not contend that the 
Director failed to review or disapproved her policy 
with American Family. 
[ I 6] The Dissent contends that the Court 
should simply defer to the Director and hold that 
the policy comports with public policy, but the fact 
that the Director may have approved these contract 
terms merely creates a presumption that they are 
valid and is not conclusive. Hansen v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. ins. 112 Idaho 663, 667-68. 735 
P.2d 974, 978-79 (1987). Of course, even if the 
Director has reviewed the terms in this case, the in-
surance policy here was executed before the Legis-
lature amended the Code to require insurers to offer 
UIM coverage. The Director could not have known 
about the Legislature's new public-policy decisions 
at that time. 
[ 17] Nearly every jurisdiction with a statutory 
UIM mandate similar to Idaho's has found exhaus-
tion clauses to be contrary to public policy. E.g. 
Country Mut. ins. Co. v. Fonk. 198 Ariz. 167, 7 
P.3d 973, 978 (Ariz.Ct.App.2000); Taylor v. Gov't 
Employees ins. Co., 90 Hawai'i 302, 978 P.2d 740, 
746, 751 (1999); Buzzard v. Farmers ins. Co., 824 
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P.2d I I 05, 1112 (Okla.1992); Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co. v. Faris, '27 Mass.App.Ct. 194, 536 N.E.2d 
1097, 1099-100 (1989); Chambers v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 442 Pa.Super. I 55, 658 A.2d 1346, 1348 
( 1995); *625**818Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Vassas, 
139 N.J. 163,652 A.2d 162,166 (1995); Mann v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 108 Nev. 648, 836 P.2d 620, 
621 (1992) overruled on other grounds by White v. 
Cont'! Ins. Co., 119 Nev. 114, 65 P.3d 1090, I 092 
(2003). But see Ploen v. Union Ins. Co., 253 Neb. 
867, 573 N.W.2d 436, 443 (I 998) (rejecting a pub-
lic policy challenge).FN3 These cases comport with 
the overall majority position nationwide that ex-
haustion clauses are void and, under the construct-
ive-exhaustion doctrine/N~ do not prevent an in-
sured from "exhausting" the tortfeasor's policy by 
settling for an amount less than the policy limits. 
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Hurley, 76 Cal.App.4th 797, 
90 Cal.Rptr.2d 697, 700 (1999); Horace Mann Ins. 
Co. v. Adkins, 215 W.Va. 297, 599 S.E.2d 720, 729 
n. 12 (2004); e.g. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. 
Knight, 506 So.2d 75, 77 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987); 
Metcalf v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 944 
S.W.2d 151, 153 (Ky.Ct.App.1997). To prevent the 
UIM carrier from paying extra-contractual benefits, 
however, "the underinsurer always is allowed to 
credit the full amount of the tortfeasor's liability 
coverage against the insured's damages." Hamilton 
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 107 Wash.2d 
721, 733 P .2d 213, 217 ( 1987); accord Sorber v. 
Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 451 Pa.Super. 507, 680 
A.2d 881,882 (1996). 
FN3. American Family relies heavily on a 
Wisconsin case, Danbeck v. American 
Fami~y Mut. Ins. Co., 245 Wis.2d 186, 629 
N.W.2d 150 (2001), as an instance when a 
court rejected a public-policy challenge 
and enforced the literal language of an ex-
haustion clause. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, however, did not incorporate the 
state's statutory UIM mandate into its pub-
lic-policy analysis, nor even mention that 
such a mandate existed, as the public-
policy challenge in that case apparently 
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rested only on common law. Id at I 56 
(analyzing only an intermediate court's rul-
ing on state public policy). Indeed, juris-
dictions in which a UIM statute did not 
play into the legal analysis have tended to 
be more evenly divided on whether to en-
force exhaustion clauses. Compare Birch-
field, 875 S. W.2d at 504 (enforcing the ex-
haustion clause as written), State v. Mum-
mert, 879 S. W.2d 525, 528-29 (Mo.1994) 
(same), with Omni Ins. Co. v. Foreman, 
802 So.2d 195, 197 (Ala.200 I) (holding 
that the UIM claimant did not forfeit her 
benefits by settling for less than the policy 
limits), and Augustine v. Simonson, 283 
Mont. 259, 940 P.2d 116, 120 (Mont.1997) 
(implementing the constructive-exhaustion 
doctrine). Here, of course, a statute does 
directly bear on the public-policy analysis, 
so these cases are inapplicable. 
FN4. Although most cases adopt this posi-
tion, they do not necessarily use the tenn 
"constructive exhaustion." Instead, many 
jurisdictions state that the UIM carrier's 
payments are "offset" by the tortfeasor's 
policy limits. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. 
Adkins, 215 W.Ya. 297, 599 S.E.2d 720, 
727 (2004). 
Conversely, nearly every state that has rejected 
the constructive-exhaustion doctrine has done so 
because a statute either expressly allowed or ex-
pressly required UIM coverage to be conditioned 
on an exhaustion clause like the one at issue here. 
FN5 The Idaho statute, by comparison, simply re-
quires insurance policies delivered or issued in 
Idaho to contain underinsurance coverage unless 
expressly rejected in writing by the insured. I.C. § 
41-2502(1 ), (2).FN6 The Idaho Code neither re-
quires nor expressly pennits exhaustion clauses. 
FN5. See Curran v. Progressive Nw. Ins. 
Co., 29 P.3d 829, 832-33 (Alaska 2001) 
(citing Alaska Stat. § 28.20.445); Hurley, 
90 Cal.Rptr.2d at 701 (citing Cal. Ins.Code 
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§ l 1580.2(p)(3)); Continental Ins. Co. v. 
Cebe-Habersky, 214 Conn. 209, 571 A.2d 
I 04, 106 (1990) (citing Conn. Gen.Stat. § 
38-l 75c(b)(l)); Daniels v. Johnson, 270 
Ga. 289, 509 S.E.2d 4 I, 43 (1998) (citing 
Ga.Code Ann. §§ 33-7-1 l(b)(])(D)(ii), 
33-24--41.1); Lemna v. United Servs. Auto. 
Ass'n, 273 Ill.App.3d 90, 209 Ill.Dec. 942, 
652 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1995) (citing 215 lll. 
Comp. Stat. 5/143a-2(7) (1992)); Federal 
Ins. Co. v. Watnick, 80 N.Y.2d 539, 592 
N.Y.S.2d 624, 607 N.E.2d 771, 774 (1992) 
(citing N.Y. Ins. Law § 3420(f)(2)); see 
also McCrary v. Byrd, 148 N.C.App. 630, 
559 S.E.2d 821, 825 (2002) (citing N.C. 
Gen.Stat. § 20-279.21 (b)( 4) (1999), stating 
that exhaustion occurs when the policy 
limits "have been paid upon the claim"). 
FN6. Oregon, by contrast, has invalidated 
exhaustion clauses primarily on statutory 
grounds. Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co., 323 Or. 
291,918 P.2d 95, 99, 101 (1996). 
[ 18] This Court must therefore carefully evalu-
ate whether requiring insureds to comply with UIM 
exhaustion clauses would thwart the Legislature's 
goal of protecting motorists from underinsured 
drivers. Because I.C. § 41-5202( I) is designed to 
remedy the public-safety problem created by under-
insured drivers, it is a remedial statute. "It is a well-
known canon of statutory construction that remedi-
al legislation is to be liberally construed to give ef-
fect to the intent of the legislature." *626**819 
State v. Hobby Horse Ranch Tractor & Equip. 
Co., 129 Idaho 565,567,929 P.2d 741,743 (1996). 
Other courts invalidating exhaustion clauses 
also observe that UIM statutes are remedial in 
nature. They reason that the insured's ability to re-
cover UIM benefits should be "scrupulously 
guarded" because "UIM coverage is intended to 
provide excess coverage to compensate an insured 
against losses for which there would otherwise be 
no coverage." FN7 Horace Mann, 599 S.E.2d at 
725-26. Consequently, "[t]he exhaustion clause 
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must be construed as it was intended, i.e., a 
threshold requirement and not a barrier to under-
insured motorist insurance coverage." Bogan v. 
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 22, 521 
N.E.2d 447, 453 (1988) overruled on other grounds 
by McDonald v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 45 
Ohio St.3d 27, 543 N .E.2d 456 ( 1989). 
FN7. Some states take this a step further, 
holding that any attempt to condition, di-
lute, or limit UM or UIM coverage is void. 
Union Ins. Co. v. Houtz, 883 P.2d 1057, 
I 063 (Colo.1994); Brown v. USAA Cas. 
Ins. Co., 17 Kan.App.2d 547, 840 P.2d 
1203, 1205 (1992). 
There might be reasons for a claimant to settle 
below policy limits that are unrelated to the amount 
of damages the claimant has suffered. Because it 
may be necessary or advantageous for insureds to 
accept a settlement, "[t]he insured should have the 
right to accept what he or she considers the best set-
tlement available against the tortfeasor without re-
linquishing under-insurance protection." Rucker v. 
Nat'/ Gen. Ins. Co., 442 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Iowa 
1989). The insured might wish to settle if the insur-
ance limits are too low to justify trial. Olivas v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 850 S.W.2d 564, 
567 (Tex.App.1993). The insured might also have 
immediate financial or medical reasons for needing 
to settle the UIM claim below policy limits. Cobb v. 
Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 482 S.E.2d 589, 597 
(S.C.Ct.App.1997). If the insured has to exhaust the 
policy limits to keep his or her UIM coverage, the 
tortfeasor's insurance company could force the in-
sured to go to court by offering just less than the 
policy limits. "In effect then, the victim is denied 
the perfectly reasonable choice of saving months, if 
not years, of delay, trial preparation expense, and 
all the ensuing wear and tear by simply accepting 
the offer." Longworth v. Van Houten, 223 
NJ.Super. 174, 538 A.2d 414, 423 
(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1988). The litigation would 
also likely reduce the insured's net recovery. Id. 
There would be many instances where the claimant 
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receives a greater recovery by settling than by pay-
ing a lawyer to pursue a lengthy and contentious 
trial for only a small amount more than the settle-
ment offer. 
Litigation would create drastic de lays for litig-
ants who may have suffered serious injuries and 
desperately need to collect benefits. These delays 
would be exacerbated by the fact that the claimant 
may have to undergo further arbitration against the 
UIM carrier after obtaining a judgment from the 
tortfeasor. See Harper v. Providence Washington 
Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 282, 284-85 (Pa.Super.Ct.2000) 
(permitting arbitration against a UIM carrier while 
the insured's claim against the tortfeasor was still 
pending). 
UIM claimants in Idaho subject to exhaustion 
clauses like this one would have even greater diffi-
culty collecting UIM benefits in collisions caused 
by more than one defendant. Although this particu-
lar issue is not presently before this Court, it high-
lights another reason for which many other jurisdic-
tions have refused to enforce exhaustion clauses. In 
such a case, the claimant would still have to ex-
haust "any bodily injury liability bonds or policies" 
before being able to collect UIM payments. The 
claimant might not be able to exhaust one of the 
tortfeasors' policy limits, especially if that tortfeas-
or was less liable relative to the other defendants. 
See I.C. § 6-802 (permitting the court to apportion 
damages among defendants). As a New York court 
reasoned, requiring the insured to exhaust all the in-
surance applicable to all vehicles involved in an ac-
cident "would emasculate the endorsement's inten-
ded effect ... to provide coverage over and above 
the limits of the tortfeasor's insurance." Colonial 
Penn Ins. Co. v. Salti, 84 A.D.2d 350, 446 
N.Y.S.2d 77, 79 (N.Y.App.Div.1982). Due to the 
inequity that UIM claimants might face when con-
fronted with multiple tortfeasors, other courts have 
permitted UIM insureds to pursue arbitration 
against *627 **820 the insurer at the same time 
claims are pending against multiple tortfeasors. 
Leslie v. W.H. Transp. Co., 338 F.Supp.2d 684, 689 
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(S.D.W.Va.2004); see also Gen. Accident Ins. Co. 
v. Wheeler, 221 Conn. 206, 603 A.2d 385, 387 
(1992) (requiring the claimant to exhaust only one 
tortfeasor's policy even though a statute expressly 
required exhaustion of all policies). 
UIM claimants, in other words, are better 
equipped than their UIM carriers to most efficiently 
resolve claims against the tortfeasor. They are in 
the best position to determine whether it is worth 
the time and expense to litigate. 
The Dissent asserts that the Legislature's 2008 
UIM amendment "does not in any way purport to 
address the procedures for making a claim under 
such coverage," and therefore does not indicate that 
there is a legislative policy aimed at protecting 
Idahoans from underinsured motorists. The Legis-
lature clearly enacted the UIM amendments to pro-
tect the citizens of this State from being undercom-
pensated for their injuries, and exhaustion clauses 
impose a substantive, not merely procedural, 
obstacle in front of accident victims seeking UIM 
benefits. Requiring victims to actually exhaust the 
tortfeasor's policy limits is not the kind of UIM 
coverage the Legislature contemplated. FNs 
FN8. The Dissent also suggests that the 
Court is simply protecting accident victims 
who fail to read their insurance policies be-
fore settling for less than the tortfeasor's 
policy limits. Nothing in this Opinion 
should be read to relieve policyholders 
from having to read and understand their 
policies. As discussed throughout this 
Opinion, however, exhaustion clauses cre-
ate myriad problems for insureds regard-
less of whether they read their policies. In-
sureds, aware of their exhaustion clauses, 
may have to undergo protracted and need-
less litigation despite needing immediate 
medical or financial support. 
Apart from the remedial nature of the UIM-
mandate statute is the entirely separate public in-
terest in judicial economy. "Public policy favors the 
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resolution of controversies and uncertainties 
through compromise and settlement rather than 
through litigation." 15A Am.Jur.2d Compromise & 
Settlement § 5. Exhaustion clauses harm the public 
interest in judicial economy in two ways. First, they 
encourage tortfeasors' insurers to litigate against 
UIM claimants. As previously mentioned, the tort-
feasor's insurer could use an exhaustion clause to 
compel litigation by offering to settle for only just 
under the policy limits. The injured collision victim 
could have to endure needless delay and expense 
litigating or lose his/her benefits. 
Second, Idaho's courts will have to contend 
with unnecessary litigation merely so that VIM 
claimants can preserve their benefits. Schmidt v. 
Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256. 260 (Minn.1983) 
(superseded by statute); Augustine v. Simonson, 283 
Mont. 259, 940 P.2d 116, 120 (1997). As this Court 
and the U.S. Supreme Court have held in cases dis-
cussing collateral estoppel and res judicata, redu-
cing repetitive or unnecessary litigation is a legit-
imate goal, as it frees up judicial resources for le-
gitimate disputes. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 
94, IOI S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308, 313 (1980) 
(stating that both collateral estoppel and res ju-
dicata conserve judicial resources); Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 
649, 58 L.Ed.2d 552, 559 (1979) (similar); Brown 
v. Fe/sen, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 2209, 
60 L.Ed.2d 767, 771 (1979) (holding that res ju-
dicata "frees the courts to resolve other disputes"); 
Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., lnc., 141 Idaho 604, 617, 
1 I 4 P.3d 974, 987 (2005) ( collateral estoppel); 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 
805 (2002) (res judicata); Anderson v. City of Poca-
tello, I 12 Idaho 176, 183,731 P.2d 171, 178 (1986) 
( collateral estoppel); see also Pines, Inc. v. Boss-
ingham, 131 Idaho 714, 717, 963 P.2d 397, 400 
(Ct.App.1998) ( collateral estoppel). 
Promoting an efficient judiciary ultimately be-
nefits the public. Given all the potential reasons 
that a VIM claimant may need to settle for just un-
der policy limits, it would be contrary to principles 
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of judicial economy to require full exhaustion by 
litigation or settlement. Cobb, 482 S.E.2d at 596-97 . 
[ 19] For the foregoing reasons, we now hold 
exhaustion clauses in LllM automobile policies to 
be void, unenforceable, and severable in Idaho. To 
collect against his or her insurer, a VIM insured 
may proceed against the VIM carrier, who must in-
vestigate and *628 **821 attempt to resolve the 
claim in good faith regardless of whether the in-
sured settled with the tortfeasor's insurer or, if so, 
for how much. Taylor, 978 P.2d at 751. The VIM 
carrier will receive credit for the full amount of the 
tortfeasor's policy, regardless of the insured's actual 
recovery. 
We decline to implement the constructive-ex-
haustion doctrine or to otherwise replace exhaus-
tion clauses with any other judicially created lan-
guage. This is primarily to prevent any confusion 
over how much settlement the insured must extract 
from the tortfeasor before approaching the VIM 
carrier for benefits. Hill suggested that courts 
should require the settlement amount to be 
"reasonable" in relationship to the tortfeasor's 
policy limits. A "reasonableness" requirement is 
unnecessary for three reasons. First, the VIM 
claimant, not his or her insurer, has to absorb the 
gap between the settlement and the tortfeasor's 
policy limits. So long as there is no prejudice res-
ulting from the settlement, there is simply no need 
for courts to determine whether the amount was 
"reasonable." Second, the UIM claimant is in the 
best position to efficiently resolve a claim by 
weighing the provable facts of the case, the finan-
cial or medical need for quick settlement, and the 
potential costs of litigation. A reasonableness re-
quirement might obstruct otherwise efficient claim 
resolution or prolong the process by calling on the 
courts to evaluate whether the settlement amount 
was "reasonable." Third, asking judges to determ-
ine whether settlements are reasonable would draw 
the parties back into court and undermine the goal 
of promoting swift claim resolution and judicial 
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economy. 
[20] Although Hill's exhaustion clause is void, 
the rest of her policy remains intact. "To the extent 
that a term requiring the occurrence of a condition 
is unenforceable [for public-policy reasons], a court 
may excuse the non-occurrence of the condition un-
less its occurrence was an essential part of the 
agreed exchange." Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § I 85 ( I 98 I); see also Nelson v. Armstrong, 
99 Idaho 422, 426, 582 P.2d 1100, 1104 (1978) ( 
"Where a transaction is composed of both benign 
and offensive components and the different por-
tions are severable, the unobjectionable parts are 
generally enforceable."). Hill will not receive a bet-
ter deal than she bargained for if she can show that 
an underinsured tortfeasor is liable to her for an 
amount exceeding his policy limits and then sets off 
those policy limits against her UIM recovery. Au-
gustine, 940 P.2d at 121; Rucker, 442 N. W .2d at 
117; see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 
742 F.2d 1028, 1036 (7th Cir.1984) (stating that the 
court "will not enforce the remainder of the con-
tract if the result will be to give the promisee a sub-
stantially better deal than he had bargained for"). 
3. Subsequent Changes in State Law That Are De-
signed to Protect the Public Welfare Can Invalidate 
a Contract Provision on Public Policy Grounds 
American Family contends that since the Le-
gislature only began requiring insurers to offer UIM 
coverage in 2009, no statutory public policy aimed 
at protecting the pub lie from underinsured drivers 
existed when Hill entered into her insurance con-
tract in July of 2005. See § 1, 2008 Idaho Sess. 
Laws at 183-84 (amending LC. § 41-2502 effect-
ive January I, 2009). American Family reasons that 
this Court would be applying the statute retroact-
ively if it allowed Hill to collect UIM benefits 
without having settled for the tortfeasors' policy 
limits. 
[21] It is true that § 41-2502 is not retroactive. 
No statute is retroactive unless the Legislature ex-
pressly declares that it is. J.C. § 73-101; Henderson 
v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444,448,915 P.2d 6, 10 (1996) 
Page 15 of 24 
Page 14 
. "A statute will not be given a retroactive construc-
tion by which it will impose liabilities not existing 
at the time of its passage." Doe v. Boy Scouts of 
Am., 148 Idaho 427, 431, 224 P.3d 494, 498 (2009) 
(quoting Ford v. City of Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 
509, 321 P.2d 589. 594 (I 958)). The Legislature 
did not expressly provide for its amendment to § 
41-2502 to apply to preexisting insurance policies. 
In addition, there is plenty of authority holding that 
contracts are interpreted according to the law at the 
time the contract is executed. E.g. Smith v. Idaho 
Hosp. Serv., Inc., 89 Idaho 499, 503, 406 P.2d 696, 
698 (1965); *629**822Northland Ins. Co. v. 
Boise's Best Autos & Repairs, 132 Idaho 228, 23 I, 
970 P.2d 21, 24 (Ct.App.1997), rev'd on other 
grounds, 131 Idaho 432, 958 P.2d 589 (1998) 
(applying the rule specifically to insurance con-
tracts). 
[22][23][24] Nonetheless, regardless of when 
J.C. § 41-2502(1) was enacted, it is the Court's re-
sponsibility not to enforce a contract provision that 
is contrary to public policy. "Public policy is not 
static, but may change as the relevant factual situ-
ation and the thinking of the times change." Brown 
v. Snohomish Cnty. Phys. Corp., 120 Wash.2d 747, 
845 P.2d 334, 338 (I 993). The duty to avoid enfor-
cing an invalid contract term is so strong that 
Idaho's courts must raise the public policy issue sua 
sponte if necessary. Quiring, 130 Idaho at 567, 944 
P.2d at 702. The Court does not invalidate a con-
tract only if it was void at the time it was entered. 
Instead, the Court must not enforce any contract "at 
any stage in the litigation" in which it becomes ap-
parent that the provision contravenes public policy. 
Id. Thus, whenever the Court discovers that a pro-
vision is invalid, the Court must refuse to enforce it. 
[25] It is widely accepted that contracts can be 
eviscerated by a subsequent change in public 
policy. E.g. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Jarrett, 
42 F.Supp. 723, 730 (M.D.Ga.1942); V. & S. Bottle 
Co. v. Mountain Gas Co., 261 Pa. 523, I 04 A. 667, 
667 (19 I 8) (per curiam); Dorr v. Chesapeake & 
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Ohio Ry. Co., 78 W.Va. 150, 88 S.E. 666, 667 
(19 I 6); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Emp. Ass'n of Will-
ingboro Sch., 178 NJ.Super. 477, 429 A.2d 429, 
430 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1981) (noting that con-
tracts should be interpreted according to the law ex-
isting when they are formed but also that changes in 
the law may make a contract illegal). Courts have 
broadly articulated this rule. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated that "no contract can properly be 
carried into effect ... which, being made consist-
ently with the rules of law at the time, has become 
illegal in virtue of some subsequent law." Louisville 
& Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 485, 
31 S.Ct. 265, 271, 55 L.Ed. 297, 304 (191 I) 
(quotation omitted). 
Although there is expansive language in many 
cases, a rule permitting any change in public policy 
to eviscerate preexisting contracts would not serve 
Idaho well. Such a rule does not account for private 
agreements between parties that are unlikely to en-
danger the public welfare. A more refined approach 
is to nullify only those agreements that violate state 
policies designed to protect the public good, either 
because the object of the agreement is inherently 
harmful or because a condition in the agreement 
would, in the aggregate, tend to harm the public. 
See Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. 
McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 570, 31 S.Ct. 259, 263, 55 
L.Ed. 328, 339--40 (1911) (holding that the state le-
gislatures may nullify existing contracts "where the 
parties do not stand upon an equality, or where the 
public health demands that one party to the contract 
shall be protected against himself'); I 7A C.J.S. 
Contracts § 29 (stating that "legislation in exercise 
of a state's police power, or by subsequent statute 
announcing new public policy" can avoid preexist-
ing contracts). This approach prevents relatively 
unforeseeable changes in public policy from under-
mining otherwise legitimate business arrangements. 
See Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletown, 
137 N.J. 238, 645 A.2d JOO, 105 (1994) (upholding 
municipal-land leases that had not undergone pub-
I ic bidding as required by a new statute). 
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For example, New York limits the situations in 
which a shift in public policy can nullify contract 
terms. The rule there only applies to "acts of the 
Legislature which are strictly measures of public 
policy, not to those which are intended primarily to 
establish or affect the rights of parties to each oth-
er." Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 450 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214, 
86 A.D.2d 459, 461 (N.Y.App.Div.1982). New 
York's courts have considered voiding contract 
terms only when upholding them would harm the 
public or would be enforced at public expense. 
Compare CKC Chiropractic v. Republic W. Ins. 
Co., 5 Misc.3d 492, 784 N.Y.S.2d 350, 352 
(N.Y.Civ.Ct.2004) (discussing whether an insurer 
had to pay benefits to an unlicensed medical pro-
vider), Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 97 N.Y.2d 188, 
738 N.Y.S.2d 650, 764 N.E.2d 950, 953 (2001) 
(discussing whether a woman could agree to waive 
support from an ex-spouse), and G!engariff Corp. v. 
Snook, 122 Misc.2d 784, 471 N.Y.S.2d 973, 
977-79 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1984)**823 *630 (refusing to 
enforce a contract to pay a medical provider more 
than what the provider could collect under a new 
Medicaid law), with Rotodyne, Inc. v. Consol. Edis-
on Co. of Ne½' York, 55 A.D.2d 600, 389 N.Y.S.2d 
387, 388 (N. Y .App.Div.1976) (refusing to invalid-
ate a subcontractor's waiver of mechanics-lien 
rights against a general contractor). r-N 9 Although 
we decline to adopt New York law on this subject, 
these cases are instructive. 
FN9. Notably, California does not allow 
public-policy changes to affect preexisting 
contracts. Bovard v. Am. Horse Enter., 201 
Cal.App.3d 832, 247 Cal.Rptr. 340, 344 n. 
3 (1988). Nonetheless, like New York, the 
cases in which California courts refuse to 
invalidate contracts due to changed public 
policy apparently always involve private 
rights between two arms-length parties. 
E.g. Stephens v. S. Pac. Co., l 09 Cal. 86, 
41 P. 783, 786 ( 1895) (refusing to invalid-
ate a warehouse lease agreement where 
leaseholder indemnified landowner for the 
landowner's own negligence); Whitmire v. 
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HK. Ferguson Co., 26 l Cal.App.2d 594, 
68 Cal.Rptr. 78, 82 (1968) (refusing to in-
validate an agreement in which a construc-
tion subcontractor indemnified the general 
contractor for its negligence). 
As explained above, Idaho's UIM mandate was 
designed to protect the public from underinsured 
motorists, and not merely to govern private rela-
tions between parties. The Legislature has required 
that insurers offer UIM coverage to all motorists, 
not UIM coverage conditioned on totally depleting 
the tortfeasor's policy. Exhaustion clauses have no 
purpose but to dilute Idahoans' protection against 
underinsured drivers and to prevent insureds from 
collecting legitimate claims. They are a product of 
the insurance company's sophistication and bargain-
ing power. See Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co. of 
Idaho, 118 ldaho 373, 377, 797 P.2d 81, 85 (1990) 
(quotation omitted) (explaining that insurance com-
panies enjoy a significant bargaining advantage 
over insureds). They also impose additional litiga-
tion demands on the court system, which directly 
impedes public access to the courtroom. These 
threats to public safety and demands on the justice 
system occur regardless of when the parties ex-
ecuted the insurance contract. Because exhaustion 
clauses impinge on a state public policy designed to 
protect the public we !fare, they are void in the State 
of Idaho.rNio 
FN I 0. The Dissent argues that exhaustion 
clauses do indeed have a legitimate pur-
pose, stating that our opinion today simply 
indulges in "a belief in a grand conspiracy 
among evil insurance companies." This as-
sertion is hyperbole, as exhaustion clauses 
are only a matter between one insurer and 
its insured-we need not find a 
"conspiracy" to hold that this kind of 
clause violates public policy. In any event, 
the Dissent offers no legitimate alternative 
reason why an insurer would insert such a 
clause into its policies. It is possible that 
exhaustion clauses are useful to ensure that 
Page 17 of 24 
Page 16 
the tortfeasor actually could not fully com-
pensate the accident victim, but they are 
not necessary to accomplish this purpose if 
insurance carriers receive credit for the full 
limits of the tortfeasor's policy, as we hold 
today. 
The Dissent also refuses to suggest a le-
g1t1mate purpose for exhaustion clauses 
because the clauses' purpose "was not an 
issue litigated below," and the factual re-
cord on the matter is undeveloped. This 
position misunderstands how a public-
policy analysis works. Whether a con-
tract term is illegal is not a factual in-
quiry but a legal one. Farrell v. White-
man, 146 Idaho 604, 608, 200 P.3d 
1153, 1157 (2009). Since neither Amer-
ican Family nor the Dissent can come up 
with any legitimate reason to allow in-
surance companies to condition UIM 
coverage in this way, exhaustion clauses 
are illegal as a matter of law. 
In summary, the exhaustion clause is void 
based on Idaho's declared public policy aimed at 
protecting its citizens from underinsured drivers 
and on the doctrine of judicial economy, which here 
includes shielding parties from excessive litigation 
and preventing unnecessary demands on the judicial 
system. Claimants need not exhaust the limits of the 
tortfeasor's policy, but instead must credit to the 
UIM insurer the gap between the settlement with 
the tortfeasor's insurer, if any, and the policy limits. 
Because Hill settled with the Hamiltons for just un-
der their policy limits and is ready to credit the gap 
to American Family, the summary judgment in fa-
vor of American Family is vacated. 
B. Hill Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Ap-
peal 
[26] Hill has also not established that American 
Family actually owes her any amount under the 
policy and is still therefore not entitled to fees on 
appeal. The Idaho Code provides: 
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Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or 
contract of insurance, surety, guaranty or indem-
nity of any kind or nature *631 **824 whatso-
ever, which shall fail for a period of thirty (30) 
days after proof of loss has been furnished as 
provided in such policy, certificate or contract, to 
pay to the person entitled thereto the amount 
justly due under such policy, certificate or con-
tract, shall in any action thereafter brought 
against the insurer in any court in this state or in 
any arbitration for recovery under the terms of 
the policy, certificate or contract, pay such fur-
ther amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable 
as attorney's fees in such action or arbitration. 
J.C. § 41-1839(1) (emphases added). If Hill 
prevails on appeal, she has only succeeded in hav-
ing the summary judgment against her vacated. Al-
though the exhaustion clause would not bar her re-
covery, under I.C. § 41-1839(1) she still must es-
tablish the "amount justly due under [her] policy," 
if any. She therefore shall not receive attorney fees 
on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because the exhaustion clause in Hill's UIM 
policy with American Family violates public 
policy, it cannot bar her recovery. The district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
American Family is therefore vacated and this case 
is remanded to the district court for further proceed-
ings consistent with this Opinion. Hill is not en-
titled to attorney fees on appeal because she has not 
yet established that an amount, if any, is justly due 
under the policy. Costs to Appellant. 
Justices BURDICK and J. JONES concur. 
Chief Justice EISMANN, dissenting. 
Because the majority usurps the authority of 
the legislature and the director of the Department of 
Insurance to strike a provision from an insurance 
contract that the majority simply happens to dislike, 
I respectfully dissent. 
This case revolves around a policy provision 
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which provides, with respect to underinsured mo-
torist (UIM) coverage, " We will pay under this 
coverage only after the limits of liability under any 
bodily injury liability bonds or policies have been 
exhausted by payment of judgements or settle-
ments." (Bold type in original.) This provision, an 
exhaustion clause, is concededly unambiguous. The 
majority strikes it from the insurance policy on the 
ground that it allegedly violates public policy and 
the newly created doctrine of judicial economy. As 
will be shown, there is no recognized public policy 
in Idaho that it violates and the doctrine of judicial 
economy is nonsensical. In actuality, it is the ma-
jority opinion that violates public policy as ex-
pressly declared by statute. 
Before addressing Idaho's public policy, I will 
address the majority's assertion that "[n]early every 
jurisdiction with a statutory UIM mandate similar 
to Idaho's has found exhaustion clauses to be con-
trary to public policy." We would not condone our 
children's misconduct based upon the excuse that 
other kids were doing it too, and such an argument 
does not validate the majority opinion. Whatever 
may be the authority of courts in other jurisdictions 
to modify insurance contracts, in Idaho "[c]ourts do 
not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts in 
order to make them more equitable." Lavey v. Re-
gence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 41, 72 
P.3d 877, 881 (2003); accord Losee v. Idaho Co., 
148 Idaho 2 I 9, 223, 220 P.3d 575, 579 (2009). The 
exhaustion clause must violate the public policy of 
Idaho, not that of some other state. 
"Public policy may be found and set forth in 
the statutes, judicial decisions or the constitution." 
Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 
Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332, 336 (2005). Thus, 
the question is what statute, judicial decision, or 
constitutional provision declares a public policy 
that is violated by the exhaustion clause. Each of 
the three sources of public policy will be addressed 
separately. 
1. Constitutional provision. Public policy may 
be found in the Constitution. Id. The majority does 
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not contend that the exhaustion clause violates any 
constitutional provision. 
2. Statute. The majority cites Idaho Code § 
41-2502 as amended in 2008, but it is clear that the 
exhaustion clause does not expressly or implicitly 
violate any public policy declared by that statute. 
First, that statute**825 *632 does not even apply to 
the insurance policy in this case. It only applies to 
"the issuance of any new policy or the first renewal 
or replacement of any existing policy of motor 
vehicle liability insurance with an effective date on 
or after January !, 2009. " Idaho Code § 
41-2502(3) (20IO) (emphasis added).FN 11 The in-
surance policy in this case had an effective date of 
July I 9, 2005, almost three and one-half years prior 
to January I, 2009.FN12 The majority's assertion 
that the exhaustion clause in this policy violates 
some public policy declared by the 2008 amend-
ment to the statute is directly contrary to the legis-
lature's expressly declared public policy regarding 
the insurance policies to which the amendment ap-
plies. 
FN 11. This subsection provides: 
Prior to the issuance of any new policy 
or the first renewal or replacement of 
any existing policy of motor vehicle li-
ability insurance with an effective date 
on or after January 1, 2009, a named in-
sured shall be provided a standard state-
ment approved by the director of the de-
partment of insurance, explaining in 
summary form, both uninsured and un-
derinsured motorist coverage, and the 
different forms of underinsured motorist 
coverage that might be available from 
insurers in Idaho. 
FN12. The policy stated that it was " EF-
FECTIVE FROM 07-19-2005 TO 
I 2-22-2005." (Bold type in original.) 
Second, the statute requires insurance compan-
ies to offer UIM coverage, but Idaho Code § 
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41-2502(2) grants the named insured "the right to 
reject either or both uninsured motorist coverage or 
underinsured motorist coverage." Because the in-
sured has the right to reject UIM coverage entirely, 
it is difficult to see how there is a public policy pro-
hibiting an insured from entering into an insurance 
contract that requires exhaustion of the limits of the 
tortfeasor's liability policy before the insured can 
collect UIM benefits. 
Third, even if the 2008 amendment had applied 
to the policy in this case, the statute does not ex-
pressly or implicitly address exhaustion clauses or 
any of the procedures applicable to making a claim 
under UIM coverage. The majority concedes, "The 
Idaho Code neither requires nor expressly permits 
exhaustion clauses," and the majority does not 
identify any statutory provision even allegedly im-
plicitly violated by the exhaustion clause. The 2008 
amendment merely requires insurance companies to 
offer underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in their 
motor vehicle liability policies. It does not in any 
way purport to address the procedures for making a 
claim under such coverage. The majority cannot ex-
plain how a requirement that an insured establish 
that the tortfeasor was in fact underinsured as a pre-
condition to recovering UIM benefits violates the 
public policy requiring insurance companies to 
merely offer UIM coverage in their motor vehicle 
liability policies. It states, "The Legislature clearly 
enacted the UIM amendments to protect the citizens 
of this State from being undercompensated for their 
injuries .... " It also refers to "Idaho's UIM mandate 
[that] was designed to protect the public from un-
derinsured motorists .... " The majority seems to 
think that UIM coverage is mandatory, rather than 
coverage that the insured has the option to pur-
chase. The majority's hyperbole indicates it be-
lieves that a statute simply requiring insurance 
companies to offer UIM coverage will somehow 
magically reduce accidents caused by underinsured 
motorists. 
In fact, it is the majority opinion, not the ex-
haustion clause, that violates public policy as ex-
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pressly declared by statute. Idaho Code § 
41-2502(!) requires that insurers offer uninsured 
and underinsured coverage in their motor vehicle li-
ability insurance policies " under provisions ap-
proved by the director of the department of insur-
ance, for the protection of persons insured thereun-
der who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of uninsured and under-
insured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death, resulting there-
from." (Emphasis added.) The public policy de-
clared by statute is that the director of the Depart-
ment of Insurance, not this Court, has the authority 
to determine whether provisions of an insurance 
policy that do not conflict with any express stat-
utory requirement are consistent with public policy. 
There was a time when this Court correctly refused 
to usurp the authority granted by the legislature to 
the director. 
**826 *633 In Hammon v. Farmers Insurance 
Co. of Idaho, 109 Idaho 286, 707 P.2d 397 (] 985), 
the insureds were injured when they swerved to 
avoid an oncoming vehicle that had crossed into 
their lane of travel and crashed. The uninsured mo-
torist coverage of their insurance policy included 
injury by '' hit-and-run" vehicles, but it required 
that such vehicles have "physical contact" with the 
insured or the vehicle the insured was occupying. 
By swerving, the insureds had avoided colliding 
with the oncoming vehicle, so there was no physic-
al contact with that vehicle. They sued, contending 
that the physical-contact requirement in their insur-
ance policy was void as against public policy. In 
deciding that it was not, we stated, "Because the 
Idaho statute neither mandates nor prohibits unin-
sured motorist coverage in hit-and-run situations, 
the physical contact requirement becomes a matter 
of contract between the insured and the insurer 
which we will not disturb." Id. at 289, 707 P.2d at 
400. 
We noted, referring to Idaho Code § 41-2502, 
that "the uninsured motorist statute itself specific-
ally mentions that automobile insurance policies 
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must be approved by the director." FNi, We then 
stated, "The director's construction of insurance 
policies is entitled to great weight and will be fol-
lowed by this Court absent cogent reasons for hold-
ing otherwise." Id 
FNl 3. Prior to the 2008 amendment of 
Idaho Code § 41-2502, it provided that 
motor vehicle liability policies must in-
clude uninsured motorist coverage, unless 
the insured rejected that coverage. The 
statute also stated that the coverage was to 
be "under provisions approved by the dir-
ector of the department of insurance, for 
the protection of persons insured thereun-
der who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of unin-
sured motor vehicles because of bodily in-
jury, sickness or disease, including death, 
resulting therefore." Ch. 61, § I, 1967 
Idaho Sess. Laws 124, 125. Except for 
adding "and underinsured" before the 
words "motor vehicle," that provision re-
mained unchanged when the statute was 
amended in 1988 to include underinsured 
coverage. Ch. 69, § 1, 2008 Idaho Sess. 
Laws 183, 183. 
Justice Bistline dissented in Hammon, making 
arguments similar to those in the majority opinion 
in the instant case. He wrote, "a growing number of 
courts, like the Court of Appeals, have found that 
physical contact requirements violated the intent of 
these statutes [like Idaho Code § 41-2502]." Id. at 
290, 707 P.2d at 40 I (emphasis in original). He 
contended that this Court should not "dwell[ ] on 
the face value of the words of the statute," but 
should "probe deeper for a statute's meaning." Id. at 
291, 707 P.2d at 402. He argued, "In reviewing the 
uninsured motorist coverage statute, to end all ana-
lysis at the surface is to frustrate the statute's pur-
pose." Id. Quoting from the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii, he called the physical-contact requirement 
an "arbitrary barricade erected to eliminate all 
claims for damages resulting from one car acci-
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dents" and stated that such requirement 
"unjustifiably impedes effectuation of the statutory 
policy of protection for insureds against damage 
from the negligence of unidentified drivers." Id. He 
concluded by criticizing the director of the Depart-
ment of Insurance, stating, "As a final thought, the 
Director of the Department of Insurance may be 
elated to discover that his apparent approval of the 
defendant carrier's policy may be the very factor 
which today has thrown the scales of justice out of 
balance." Id. at 292, 707 P.2d at 403. Fortunately, 
the majority in Hammon was not swayed by Justice 
B istline's hyperbole. 
In Hansen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987) 
, the insureds brought an action to recover under the 
uninsured motorist (UM) coverage of three differ-
ent motor vehicle policies issued by State Farm for 
three separate vehicles. Because the insureds 
claimed that their damages exceeded the policy lim-
it of the UM coverage in the policy covering the 
vehicle they were occupying when it was struck by 
an uninsured driver, they contended that they were 
entitled to stack the uninsured motorist coverages 
of all three policies. The policies each had an anti-
stacking clause, but the trial court held that such 
clause violated public policy. On appeal, we re-
versed the trial court. 
In doing so, we recognized the authority gran-
ted by the legislature to the director of the Depart-
ment of Insurance to determine whether insurance 
policy provisions comport with public policy. We 
stated, "The Director *634 **827 of the Depart-
ment of Insurance is the person entrusted by the le-
gislature to determine whether or not given policies 
comport with the public interest. Policies approved 
by the Director are thus presumed to be in harmony 
with public policy." Id. at 667--68, 735 P.2d at 
978-79. We then stated, "In the absence of proof 
that a policy contains provisions which conflict 
with express legislative directives, the Director's 
approval of an insurance policy form is an adminis-
trative determination that the policy form is in the 
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'public interest.' "Id. (emphasis added). 
There is no contention that the exhaustion 
clause conflicts with any express legislative direct-
ives. Indeed, it is the majority opinion that conflicts 
with the express legislative directive that it is the 
director of the Department of Insurance who is 
granted the authority to approve of provisions in 
underinsured motorist coverage and to determine if 
they are in accordance with public policy. As we 
recently stated, "Policies that are approved by the 
Director of the Department of Insurance are pre-
sumed to be in accordance with public policy. Ab-
sent an assertion to the contrary, this Court assumes 
the policy was submitted to and approved by the 
Director." American Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 
140 Idaho 394, 399, 94 P.3d 699, 704 (2004) 
( citations omitted). 
3. Judicial decision. Prior to 2008, there were 
no statutes in Idaho dealing with UIM coverage. In 
Meckert v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 108 Idaho 
597, 701 P.2d 217 (I 985), this Court held that there 
was no public policy in Idaho regarding UIM cov-
erage. We stated as follows: 
[T]he Idaho statutes do not regulate underinsured 
motorist coverage. There are no requirements that 
insurance carriers offer such underinsured motor-
ist coverage, nor that motorists have such under-
insured coverage. Neither the Idaho legislature 
nor the courts have declared that there exists a 
public policy applicable to underinsured motorist 
coverage. While such a policy might be desirable, 
that public policy should be enunciated by our le-
gislature and not by this Court. 
Id. at 600, 701 P.2d at 220 (italics in original; 
citations omitted). We reiterated that holding in Er-
land v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 136 Idaho 131, 
133, 30 P.3d 286, 288 (200 l ), wherein we stated, 
"There exists no public policy in regard to under-
insured motorist coverage." 
The majority contends that public policy has 
somehow changed and that "the exhaustion clause 
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is void based on Idaho's declared public policy fa-
voring UIM coverage and on the doctrine of judi-
cial economy." Neither of these rationales makes 
sense. 
The majority does not explain where this al-
leged doctrine of "favoring UIM coverage" arises, 
since the legislature only required that insurance 
companies offer such coverage and expressly 
provided that insureds can reject it. Does that mean 
UIM coverage is more favored than other types of 
insurance coverage? Can a court modify to its lik-
ing contractual provisions regarding UIM coverage, 
but not fire coverage or theft coverage? 
This Court has never recognized a "doctrine of 
judicial economy," whatever that is. The majority's 
list of examples allegedly supporting this doctrine 
are totally unsupported by anything in the record, 
nor is there anything indicating how often, if at all, 
they have occurred in Idaho. We have encouraged 
court procedures that promote judicial economy and 
have recognized that the doctrine of res judicata is 
based, in part, upon judicial economy, but we have 
never stricken or modified a contractual provision 
on the ground that doing so would promote judicial 
economy. If that supposed doctrine trumps contrac-
tual provisions, a court presiding over a breach of 
contract case should simply declare void the con-
tractual provision(s) allegedly violated in order to 
avoid the necessity of further court proceedings and 
thereby promote judicial economy. In actuality, in 
this case following the law and sustaining the ex-
haustion clause would promote judicial economy. 
The case would be ended. 
In an attempt to justify its opinion, the majority 
states, "There might be reasons for a claimant to 
settle below policy limits that are unrelated to the 
amount of damages the claimant has suffered." That 
was certainly true in th is case. Plaintiff settled for 
$1,000 less than the tortfeasor's policy limits be-
cause**828 *635 prior to settling neither the 
Plaintiff nor her attorney had ever read her insur-
ance policy, and neither of them knew she had UIM 
coverage. During oral argument, the followed ex-
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changed occurred: 
Justice Warren Jones: Do you say that she didn't 
think she had underinsured coverage at the time 
she settled? 
Mr. Johnson: That's correct, your Honor. She 
thought that she just had a bare bones policy and 
didn't have underinsured motorist coverage. 
Justice Warren Jones: Okay. 
Mr. Johnson: She wasn't aware of the exclusion 
that I just mentioned on page nineteen of her 
policy that states that American Family will pay 
under coverage only after the limits of liability 
under any policy, liability bonds or policies have 
been exhausted by payment or judgments or set-
tlement. 
The policy states in bold letters at the top of the 
first page, "PLEASE READ YOUR POLICY." Had 
either the Plaintiff or her attorney read Plaintiff's 
insurance policy, they would have known of the ex-
haustion clause and undoubtedly would not have 
settled with the tortfeasor for $ I ,000 less than the 
limits of his liability coverage. Had they refused to 
settle for less than the policy limits of $25,000, the 
tortfeasor's insurer would undoubtedly have paid 
the policy limits rather than incurring thousands of 
dollars in legal fees in an attempt to save $1,000. 
We have previously stated, "It is certainly not the 
law in Idaho that an insured has no obligation to 
read his policy .... " Foster v. Johnstone, 107 ldaho 
61, 67, 685 P.2d 802, 808 (1984). Apparently, the 
public policy underlying the newly created 
"doctrine of judicial economy" is that insureds, and 
their attorneys, should not be burdened with read-
ing insurance policies and that there should be no 
consequences from failing to do so. Judicial eco-
nomy is apparently also promoted by modifying in-
surance contracts to avoid malpractice claims 
against attorneys who advise their clients to settle 
claims against tortfeasors with insufficient liability 
insurance coverage before determining whether 
their clients have UIM coverage and, if so, the 
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policy provisions applicable to such coverage. 
In addition, the majority opinion does not 
merely apply to claimants who choose to settle for 
less than the tortfeasor's policy limits. It would also 
apply to cases in which the insured's claim against 
the tortfeasor went to trial, and the jury verdict was 
for less than the tortfeasor's policy limits. Under the 
majority opinion, the insured would be able to still 
make a claim under the UIM coverage, hoping to be 
more successful the second time. 
The majority states, "Exhaustion clauses have 
no purpose but to dilute Idahoans' protection 
against underinsured drivers and to prevent in-
sureds from collecting legitimate claims." Of 
course, there is absolutely nothing in the record 
supporting this hyperbole, and it is more indicative 
of a belief in a grand conspiracy among evil insur-
ance companies than any understanding as to the 
purpose of an exhaustion clause. The majority 
faults me for not offering a "legitimate alternative 
reason why an insurer would insert such a clause 
into its policies." I have not done so because that 
was not an issue litigated below, and there is no 
evidence in the record regarding it. Although I 
could hypothesize a reason, I prefer to make de-
cisions based upon facts in the record rather than 
upon wild accusations. There is likewise nothing in 
the record to support the majority's claims regard-
ing the difficulties that may be caused by the ex-
haustion clause, nor is there any evidence as to how 
often, if ever, such difficulties have occurred in 
Idaho. By asserting that the court can void contrac-
tual provisions that may possibly, in some unknown 
percentage of cases, increase judicial workloads, 
the majority is confused about its proper role. It ap-
parently believes it is also the legislative body in 
this state. 
There was a time when this Court recognized 
its proper role and the limits of its knowledge and 
authority. In Blackburn v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co .. I 08 Idaho 85, 697 P.2d 425 
( 1985), the plaintiff had obtained a judgment for 
$150,000 against the driver of a car that collided 
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with a vehicle occupied by his wife and three of his 
children. She and one child were killed and the oth-
er two children were injured. The tortfeasor's liabil-
ity insurer *636 **829 paid the policy limits of 
$20,000, of which the plaintiff received $10,000. 
He then brought an action against his own insur-
ance company seeking to recover under his unin-
sured motorist coverage. He contended that the tort-
feasor was an uninsured motorist to the extent that 
his liability insurance was insufficient to com-
pensate the plaintiff for his damages. The plaintiff 
asked this Court to so hold by following the reason-
ing of the Arizona and Hawaii Supreme Courts. 
We noted "the anomaly [sic] presented by the 
circumstances, particularly that a holder of a policy 
containing uninsured motorist coverage may well 
be in a better position if a tortfeasor carries no in-
surance whatsoever rather than carrying the minim-
um coverage mandated by the statute." Id at 90, 
697 P.2d at 430. However, we correctly refused to 
follow the example of the Arizona and Hawaii 
courts because "such clearly would be to indulge in 
judicial legislation under the guise of statutory in-
terpretation." Id We understood that such judicial 
rewriting of insurance policies could likely result in 
an increase of insurance costs to the motoring pub-
lic. Id We recognized that the plaintiff was, in ac-
tuality, asking us to make a policy decision, which 
"should rest on factors militating for or against that 
decision." Id We held, however, that such policy 
decision should be made by the legislature based 
upon adequate information. We stated, "However, 
all of such questions should be dealt with on the 
basis of adequate information (little of which is be-
fore this Court) by a legislative body equipped and 
authorized to make such policy decisions." Id 
In the instant case, the majority has indulged in 
judicial legislation under the guise of some ill-
defined public policy and a newly created doctrine 
of judicial economy. The policy decision of wheth-
er to prohibit exhaustion clauses should be made by 
the legislature, or by the director of the Department 
of Insurance, based upon adequate information, 
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which the majority lacks. ln Blackburn, this Court 
"urge[d] legislative attention to the inequitable res-
ults which flow from the language of our statutes." 
Id However, in Blackburn, Hammon, and Hansen, 
this Court understood its proper role and had the 
rectitude to refrain from usurping the authority of 
the legislature and the director of the Department of 
Insurance. We should follow that example. 
Justice HORTON concurs. 
Idaho,2011. 
Hill v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. 
150 Idaho 619,249 P.3d 812 
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